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NOTE
JEWISH PRISONERS AND THEIR FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A KOSHER MEAL:
AN EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN PRISON DIETARY POLICY AND
CORRECTIONAL GOALS
"'You can imprison their bodies, but you shouldn't imprison their
souls.'"'

INTRODUCTION
In all areas of life, observant Jews are "bound by Biblical
principles that have been passed down from generation to
generation,"2 and these mandates of Judaism do not disappear
once inside the prison gate. There are approximately 6,000 to
8,000 Jewish men and women confined in federal, state, and
local prisons.3 Although it may appear to be a blessing to
members of the Jewish faith that Jewish prisoners comprise
such a small percentage of a total prison population of more
than 1.5 million,4 observant Jewish prisoners have faced endless difficulties with prison regulations prohibiting many of
their religious practices. For example, prison regulations have
5
restricted Jewish prisoners' right to wear a beard, right to
'NY Prisons Offering Hot Kosher Meals; Advocate Says Plan Frees Inmates'
Souls, AEIZ. REPUBLIC, Mar. 12, 1994, at All [hereinafter Hot Kosher Meals]
(quoting Bennett Epstein, attorney and advocate for system-wide availability of
kosher food).
2 Yehuda M. Braunstein, Note, Will Jewish Prisoners Be Boerne Again? Legislative Responses to City of Boerne v. Flores, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 2333, 2333
(1998) (discussing history of Religious Freedom Restoration Act and arguing for
more free exercise protection to religious groups).
' Hearings on The Need for Federal Protection of Religious Freedom After
Boerne v. Flores Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 1-2 (1998) (statement of Isaac M. Jaroslawicz, Director of Legal Affairs for the Aleph Institute).
4 Id. at 2.
" See Friedman v. Lewis, 912 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that prison
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wear a yarmulke,6 and right to use candles to observe religious rituals.7 But perhaps the most important religious practice commonly prohibited or curtailed by prison regulations is
the right to keep kosher.8
In trying to comply with the laws of kashruth,9 Jewish
prisoners have made a wide-range of dietary requests based on
First Amendment free exercise principles,"0 including, inter
alia, requests for a catered kosher breakfast," a hot plate and
access to a room to prepare meals for Passover, 12 food certified by the Central Rabbinical Congress, 3 and hot kosher
meals provided at the state's expense. 4 Although Jewish pris-

regulation prohibiting facial hair not a violation of Jewish inmate's First
Amendment right because regulation was reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests); see also Abraham Abramovsky, First Amendment Rights of
Jewish Prisoners:Kosher Food, Skullcaps, and Beards, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 241,
250-59 (1994) (analyzing Jewish inmates' First Amendment right to wear a beard).
6 See Young v. Lane, 922 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that policy of
permitting Jewish inmates to wear yarmulkes only inside prison cell and during
religious services not a First Amendment violation); see also Abramovsky, supra
note 5, at 259-65 (analyzing Jewish inmates' right to wear a yarmulke).
" See Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that regulation
prohibiting Jewish inmates from possessing and using candles to observe religious
rituals reasonably related to safety and security concerns).
8 See Abramovsky, supra note 5, at 265-71 (analyzing Jewish inmates' First
Amendment right to kosher diets); Braunstein, supra note 2, at 2335-37 (noting
that observant Jewish inmates are obligated to follow laws of kashruth); Eric J.
Zogry, Comment, Orthodox Jewish Prisoners and the Turner Effect, 56 LA. L. REV.
905, 906-12 (1996) (discussing Turner/O'Lone standard and its effect on Jewish
inmates' attempts to procure kosher diets).
' The laws of kashruth are the Jewish laws and customs relating to the types
of food permitted for consumption and the preparation of such food. See Gerald F.
Masoudi, Kosher Food Regulation and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 667, 668 (1993).
10 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides,
in pertinent part, that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment or religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
" See Cooper v. Rogers, 788 F. Supp. 255, 258 (D. Md. 1991) (denying Jewish
inmate's request for catered kosher breakfast on grounds that catered breakfast
was too costly and kosher items were available on regular prison menu).
12 See Schlesinger v. Carlson, 489 F. Supp. 612 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (granting
Hassidic Jewish inmate access to hot plate and room to prepare Passover meals).
"3 See Prushinowski v. Hambrick, 570 F. Supp. 863, 864-67 (E.D.N.C. 1983)
(holding that food certified by Central Rabbinical Congress should be provided to
Jewish inmate). The Central Rabbinical Congress certifies the types of food which
can be eaten by Orthodox Jews in the Hasidic community. See id. at 865 n.2.
14 See Johnson v. Horn, 150 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 1998)
(denying Jewish inmates'
request for hot kosher meals on grounds that legitimate penological interests
would be compromised).
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oners have occasionally been successful in obtaining kosher
5
food under their First Amendment free exercise rights, prison officials have frequently referred to important penological
objectives to prohibit or curtail Jewish prisoners' right to a
kosher meal. The most common penological interests asserted
for prohibiting or limiting Jewish prisoners' right to a kosher
6
diet include: running a simplified prison food service, cost
considerations, 7 institutional security," and proliferation of
9
other religious dietary demands.
While this Note is mindful of the fact that "[f]ederal courts
give great deference to prison officials' decisions with respect to
the running of prisons," ° it seeks to focus on the tenuous nex" See, e.g., Beerheide v. Zavaras, 997 F. Supp. 1405 (D. Colo. 1998) (granting

Orthodox Jewish prisoners injunction compelling prison to provide them with kosher meals); Ashelman v. Wawrzaszek, 111 F.3d 674 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[Plrison
must provide a diet sufficient to sustain [Orthodox Jewish prisoner] in good health
without violating the laws of Kashrut."); United States v. Kahane, 396 F. Supp.
687 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that Orthodox Jewish prisoner is constitutionally entitled to meals that conform to his religious dietary requirements); see also
Abramovsky, supra note 5, at 265-71.
16 See, e.g., Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that
prison officials have legitimate interest in running simplified dining service, but
remanding case for determination of whether denial of kosher diet was reasonably
related to that interest); see also Kahey v. Jones, 836 F.2d 948, 950 (5th Cir.
1988) (holding that prison has a legitimate interest in running a simplified food
service "rather than a full-scale restaurant").
" See, e.g., Beerheide, 997 F. Supp. at 1412 (noting that Colorado Department
of Corrections cited cost concerns as justification for policy of not providing kosher
diets); Cooper v. Rogers, 788 F. Supp. 255, 260 (D. Md. 1991) (denying Jewish
inmate's request for particularized kosher diet, holding that costs associated with
kosher meals "cannot be dismissed as de minimis"); see also JOHN W. PALMER,
CONsTrUIoNAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 5.2.3, at 62 (1973) (noting that economic
considerations are often cited by prison administrators as a justification for limiting inmates' free exercise of religion).
"' See, e.g., Beerheide, 997 F. Supp. at 1412 (Department of Corrections refusing to provide Jewish inmates kosher diets, arguing, inter alia, that providing
kosher meals would adversely impact security); United States v. Huss, 394 F.
Supp. 752, 762 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 520 F.2d 598 (2d. Cir.
1975) (same); see also PALMER, supra note 17, § 5.2.1, at 59 ("The duty of prison
officials to maintain security within an institution is the most frequently cited
justification for limiting an inmate's religious freedom.").
WL 230913,
19 See, e.g., Cooper v. Lanham, 145 F.3d 1323, No. 97-7183, 1998
at *2 (4th Cir. May, 7, 1998) (unpublished disposition) (discussing prison officials'
concerns that if one dietary request is granted similar demands will proliferate);
Ben-Avraham v. Moses, 1 F.3d 1246, No. 92-35604, 1993 WL 269611, at *2 (9th
Cir. July 13, 1993) (unpublished disposition) (same); Kahey, 836 F.2d at 950
(same); Beerheide, 997 F. Supp. at 1410-12 (same).
20 Madison v. Horn, No. Civ. A. 97-3143, 1998 WIL 531830, at *11 (E.D. Pa.
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us between prison dietary policy and correctional goals. Part I
of this Note explains the laws of kashruth and the significant
role it plays in Jewish prisoners' lives. Part II of this Note
traces the historical development of Jewish prisoners' First
Amendment rights to a kosher diet. This Part will: (1) analyze
the various standards the courts have applied in cases regarding prisoners' First Amendment rights; and (2) discuss the
effect these standards have had on observant Jewish prisoners'
attempts to procure kosher diets. Finally, Part III of this Note
takes a closer look at the various penological interests commonly asserted for prohibiting or curtailing Jewish prisoners'
First Amendment rights to a kosher diet and submits that,
regardless of the standard of review applied, these interests
are invalid justifications for refusing to provide kosher diets.
This Part then: (1) analyzes the Federal Bureau of Prisons
Common Fare Religious Diet program, which accommodates
the kosher dietary needs of observant Jewish inmates; and (2)
submits that the existence of such a program casts doubt on
the necessity of kosher dietary regulations.21
I. THE LAWS OF KASHRUTH

A. Its Meaning
The Hebrew term "kashruth" is "'the collective term for the
Jewish laws and customs pertaining to the types of food permitted for consumption and their preparation."'2 2 Although
the rules of kashruth, or keeping kosher, are based on the Five
Books of Moses,' Jewish dietary law "has developed continuously since [the Biblical period] through interpretation, legislation, and custom. .".'.Because the laws of kashruth are
Aug. 21, 1998) (holding that Pennsylvania Department of Corrections policies and
regulations do not unduly burden Orthodox Muslim inmates' First Amendment
rights).
21 See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 414 n.14 (1974), overruled by
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989) ("While not necessarily controlling, the
policies followed at other well-run institutions would be relevant to a determination of the need for a particular type of restriction.").
2 Masoudi, supra note 9, at 668 (citation omitted) (analyzing limitations imposed by First Amendment on kosher food laws).
' See Zogry, supra note 8,at 906-07 (discussing several passages in the Five
Books of Moses regarding kashruth).
24 Mark A. Berman, Kosher Fraud Statutes and the Establishment
Clause: Are
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classified as "divine statutes ... lacking any explicit explanation,"' rationales underlying Jewish dietary law are often
misinterpreted. For example, a common misconception about
kashruth is that it "involve[s] cleanliness or alimentary needs
in [a] hygienic or nutritional sense."26 Kosher food is neither
healthier nor cleaner than non-kosher food,27 however, and
scholars suggest that the main purpose behind these laws is
not hygiene, but holiness." "[W]hat is involved is the issue of
godliness. Each person observing kashruth is treated as if he
were in a direct relationship with God, observing what in
other religions might be considered a priestly function at the
table in the sequence of preparation and service of food and
of prayers."2 9
Observing the rules of kashruth is not a "'frivolous notion .... We are talking about a critical need of the Jew[s] to
relate with [their] God in a series of instructions that have
been [their] mark of distinction from the days that [they] left
Egypt... thousands of years ago."'3 ° Therefore, an observant

They Kosher?, 26 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 3 (1992) (alteration in original)
(quoting ELIOT N. DORFF & ATHUR ROSETr, A LIVING TREE 13-14 (1988)).
25 Id.
2 United States v. Kahane, 396 F. Supp. 687, 692 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (recognizing
Jewish inmate's constitutional right to diet that conforms to laws of kashruth).
" See Berman, supra note 24, at 4 & n.12. The author noted the following.
A kosher specialist from the [USDA] blew a hole in the perception that
[M]any
kosher foods are healthier than their secular competitors ....
cuts of meat meeting kosher standards are actually fattier than USDAapproved meats . . . which may be why consumers prefer the taste of koUSDA inspection procedures have improved to the
sher meats ....
point that occasionally animals approved for kosher slaughter fail to meet
USDA standards, rather than vice versa ....
Id. at 4 n.12 (citation omitted). Further, the author cited a study which indicated
that kosher turkeys had higher salmonella levels than non-kosher turkeys. See id.
'8 See id. at 5 ("Today there is general agreement among Orthodox and Conservative authorities that the rationale for the dietary laws has nothing to do with
In the Torah, the laws of kashrut are closely associated with the
health ....
idea of 'holiness.'"); Masoudi, supra note 9, at 668 (same); Zogry, supra note 8, at
908 (same).
29 Kahane, 396 F. Supp. at 692; see also Zogry, supra note 8, at 908 ("Through
the Torah, Judaism teaches its followers to know God and to serve God in all
ways. All deeds should be made holy, both the extraordinary and the ordinary,
'(a)nd what is more common, more ordinary, more seemingly trivial and inconsequential that [sic] the process of eating?'" (first alteration in original) (citation
omitted)).
" Kahane, 396 F. Supp. at 691 (quoting testimony of Rabbi Moishe D.
Tendler).
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Jew must maintain a strict kosher diet at all times, even when
imprisoned,3 ' and the kosher dietary laws can be interrupted
only when life is in danger. "'If all [an orthodox Jew] had was
non-kosher food to eat, he would have to wait until his physiological state-his vital signs would be so determined by competent medical authorities that he is in danger of dying-then and
only then could he partake of food ....
B. The Basic Laws
One of the primary concerns of the Jewish dietary laws
involves the types of food an observant Jew may consume and
how such food must be prepared. For example, while all fruits
and vegetables are kosher,33 the Torah prohibits the eating of
certain meat, 4 poultry, 5 and fish." In addition to prescribing the types of food that may be eaten, the laws of kashruth
also dictate the proper preparation of such food:
Only a trained kosher slaughterer (shochet) whose piety and expertise have been attested to by rabbinic authorities is qualified to
slaughter an animal. The trachea and esaphagus [sic] of the animal
are severed with a special razor-sharp, perfectly smooth blade causing instantaneous death with no pain to the animal .... After the
animal has been properly slaughtered, a trained inspector (bodek)
inspects the internal organs for any physiological abnormalities that
may render the animal non-kosher (treif). The lungs in particular,
must be examined to determine that there are no adhesions (sirchot)

3'See id. at 690-91 (summarizing testimony of Rabbi Moishe D. Tendler).
3 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting testimony of Rabbi Moishe D. Tendler).
See Berman, supra note 24, at 6.
" See Leviticus 11:3 (prohibiting the eating of animals that do not chew their
cud and are not cloven-hoofed); see also How Do I Know It's Kosher? An OU Kosher Primer (visited Nov. 6, 1998) <http'lwww.ou.org/kosher/primer.html> [hereinafter Kosher Primer].
" See Leviticus 11:13-19 (permitting the eating of chicken, turkey, and duck,
but prohibiting the consumption of fowl such as hawk and eagle); see also Kosher
Primer, supra note 34.
"' See Leviticus 11:9 (permitting the consumption of fish that have "fins and
scales in the waters, in the seas, and in the rivers"). "Among those that are cleanare carp, trout and salmon. Among those generally considered unclean are the
shark, the catfish and the eel." Masoudi, supra note 9, at 669. In addition, all
shellfish are prohibited. See Leviticus 11:9-12; see also Kosher Primer, supra note
34.
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which may be indicative of a puncture in the lungs. If an adhesion is
found, the bodek must examine it carefully to determine its
37
kashruth status.

the meat must be put through the process
After inspection,
38
of "koshering."
The dramatic growth of the American kosher food industry
in the past ten years,39 however, has made the preparation of
kosher meals easier. Observant Jews no longer have to prepare
kosher meals from scratch; instead, they can buy pre-packaged
and pre-prepared kosher items." Although these meals
must still be approved by kashruth-approval authorities,4
they make compliance with the laws of kashruth a bit
less burdensome.
Another vital facet of the Jewish dietary laws is that meat
and dairy products may not be eaten together. The Torah's
directive, "[thou shalt not seethe a kid in its mother's milk,"42
prohibits "cooking meat and milk together; eating such mixture; and deriving any benefit from such a mixture." 3 To

Kosher Primer, supra note 34.
"Koshering" involves extracting the blood from meat by either salting or
broiling the meat. See Kosher Primer, supra note 34. If the meat is not koshered
within 72 hours after slaughter, the meat must be koshered through the broiling
process. See Berman, supra note 24, at 6-7.
" See Marilyn Henry, Kosher, Tasty and Profitable, JERUSALEM POST, February
21, 1996, at 6. The author notes that the American kosher food industry has
.gone far beyond its traditional product range. The 'kosher aisle' is gone. Instead,
kosher foods are interspersed throughout the stores and may account for as much
as 40 percent of the non-meat products in supermarkets in the Northeast." Id.
40 See Kosher Primer, supra note 34 (noting that traveling observant Jews can
take frozen T.V. dinners with them); see also Joseph Hanania, Kosher Gains New
Following; Health-Food Fans, Christians Add to Growing Market, CLEV. PLAIN
DEALER, January 3, 1996, at 1E ("[Kosher foods] range from See's Candies to Dole
Pineapples, from Ronzoni macaroni to Bazooka bubble gum, from Sunkist orange
juice to Knudsen's dairy products. Kosher foods also include King's Hawaiian Bakery and Country Hearth corn bread; A & W Root Beer and Seven-Up; Pillsbury
Dough and Campbell's Soups-as well as the drinks and snacks on American, Delta
and Northwest airlines.").
When pre-packaged/pre-prepared kosher meals are heated in a non-kosher
oven, however, the foods must be heated exactly the way they are received, totally
wrapped in two layers of foil with the manufacturer's seal and the Rabbinic certification seal intact. See Kosher Primer, supra note 34.
" An example of such an authority is the Orthodox Union, the largest kosher
certification organization. See About the Orthodox Union (visited Nov. 8, 1998)
<http:J/www.ou.org/> [hereinafter Orthodox Union].
42 Exodus 23:19.
" Masoudi, supra note 9, at 669 (footnote omitted).
"
"
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comply with this directive, an observant Jew must use a separate set of utensils for meat and milk products, and these utensils must not be commonly washed or stored.'
C. The Importance of Kashruth Inside Prison Gates
Spiritual development and religious study are perhaps "the
most valuable tools for rehabilitation and to prevent recidivism."45 As one commentator noted:
Religion in prison can help an inmate 'prepare for a socially useful
life.' In fact, it has been suggested that free exercise violations can
be even more harmful to prisoners than to free persons because
prisoners' 'means of spiritual recovery are limited by the prison
environment.'... [R]eligion plays a crucial role in managing a prison and the 'positive effect that religion can have on an inmate is
immeasurable. 6

Indeed, prison officials recognize the importance of religious
involvement in prison. As an assistant state commissioner of
corrections commented, "'In a state of incarceration, especially
when you're doing heavy time, you don't have many hope pegs
to hang your being on. Religion is one of those hope pegs." '
Even the courts have recognized that "[s]tripping a prisoner of
the opportunity to maintain and strengthen his religious and
ethical values would be so counterproductive of good sentencing principles as to require reconsideration of incarceration.""

See Berman, supra note 24, at 7; Masoudi, supra note 9, at 669. To avoid
the burdens of the storage and use requirements of utensils and containers, observant Jews can use disposable utensils and containers. See Ashelman v.
Wawrzaszek, 111 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that observant Jewish
inmate could eat kosher meal with disposable utensils); United States v. Kahane,
396 F. Supp. 687, 702 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (noting that prisons could purchase prepackaged, frozen kosher meals accompanied by disposable utensils).
" Hearings on The Need for Federal Protection of Religious Freedom After
Boerne v. Flores Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 5 (1998)
(statement of Isaac M. Jaroslawicz, Director of Legal Affairs for the Aleph Institute); see also Braunstein, supra note 2, at 2384-86 (discussing studies showing
that religion has proven to be a useful form of rehabiliation for prisoners).
Braunstein, supra note 2, at 2385 (citations omitted).
' Ari L. Goldman, Sing Sing Inmates Hail Plan to Offer Kosher Meals, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 6, 1993, at 20 (quoting Rev. Earl B. Moore, a Baptist minister and
assistant state commissioner of correction).
"' Kahane, 396 F. Supp. at 695.
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Specifically, the religious practice of adhering to kosher
dietary laws has beneficial effects on Jewish prisoners' spiritual development. Jewish dietary laws "were given not for the
good of the body but that of the soul .... [Alnimals which are
permitted to be eaten are of a higher spiritual nature, resulting in a higher spiritual health and a more saintly character
for humans who consume them."49 Eating kosher food is also
"one of the best possible insurance policies to help keep the...
body pure."" As Rabbi I. Harold Sharfinan, leader of the Kosher Overseers Association of America, stated:
"Judaism is a system of laws and life inspired by divine teachings.
The Torah does not give direct reasons for kosher laws other than
they are holy. But eating kosher separates people. Those who observe kosher laws are more likely to observe other biblical injunctions and lead a healthier, moral life.""'

In addition, Jewish prisoners gain a sense of identity by
adhering to the kosher dietary laws:
Kashruth for the contemporary Jew has become a rallying point for
Jewish identity. So much so that even non-observant Soviet prisoners of Zion refused to consume non-kosher food in their prison cells
in order to affirm their identification with the Jewish people past,
present and future. Some Soviet Jewish heroes and heroines have
subsisted on diets of tea and crackers for years rather than let a
non-kosher morsel pass through their mouths.52

Moreover, the religious practice of adhering to the laws of
kashruth certainly has positive effects on Jewish prisoners'
attitudes and behaviors. Perhaps the most convincing evidence
comes directly from observant Jewish prisoners themselves. As
one Jewish inmate stated, "'Knowing that [the food is] kosher
makes me feel better. For me, it has both spiritual and physical benefits."'53 Similarly, other observant Jewish prisoners
look forward to receiving kosher meals. As an observant Jewish inmate housed in New York's Sing Sing prison remarked,
"'I was never very observant or knowledgeable before I came

" Ephraim Buchwald, Kashruth: An Interpretationfor the 20th Century (visited
Nov. 8, 1998) <http:J/www.njop.org/koshint.htm>.
Hanania, supra note 40, at 1E.
', Hanania, supra note 40, at 1E (quoting Rabbi I. Harold Sharfman).
52 Buchwald, supra note 49, at 5.
Goldman, supra note 47, at 20 (quoting Joel Kalish, a 38-year-old observant
Jewish inmate convicted of drug possession).
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[to the prison]. Everything I know, I learned here. I have discovered great knowledge and inspiration. I finally found
myself. I was lost in the world. It's a mitzvah that we all
have to observe [the Jewish dietary laws] if we want to be
good believers.' 5 4
Evidently, "Kashruth in the 20th century is far more than
a religious ritual, it is a bond which unites Jew to Jew, it is a
tether which secures an individual to a nation, it is the energy
which connects a people, and a nation, to its very roots."55
This notion has no less force inside the prison gates.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF JEWISH PRISONERS' FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO KOSHER DIETS
A. Heightened Scrutiny of Prison DietaryRegulations:Federal
Court Decisions Between 1974 and 1987 and the General
Success of Jewish Prisoners
The United States Supreme Court has never directly spoken to the issue of whether Jewish prisoners have a First
Amendment right to observe the laws of kashruth. Between
1974 and 1987, however, the Court, in several important cases,
considered the proper standard of review for prisoners' challenges to prison regulations and practices infringing on their
First Amendment rights.5 6 The first standard of review for
cases dealing with First Amendment rights in the prison context was delineated by the Court 25 years ago in Procunierv.
Martinez.5 7 In Martinez, California state prisoners brought
a class action challenging inmate mail censorship regula-

"

Id. (quoting Iznaga Ricardo, a 50-year-old Jewish inmate from Cuba who was

three years into a 10-year sentence).
" Buchwald, supra note 49, at 5.
'6 See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (applying rational basis standard of review and upholding Federal Bureau of Prisons regulation that restricted
receipt of hardback books); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc.,
433 U.S. 119 (1977) (applying a deferential, rational basis standard of review and
upheld prison regulations that prohibited, inter alia, meetings of a prisoners' labor
union); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (deferring to judgment of prison officials and upholding prison regulation that banned press and media interviews);
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974), overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott,
490 U.S. 401 (1989) (applying "important or substantial interest" test and holding
restrictions on inmate mail unconstitutional).
7 416 U.S. 396 (1974), overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
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tions that prohibited prisoner correspondence that "'unduly
complain(ed),' 'magnif(ied) grievances,' 'express(ed) inflammatory pollitical [sic], racial, religious or other views or
beliefs,' or contained matter deemed 'defamatory' or 'otherwise inappropriate."''8
The Court noted that the federal courts adopted inconsistent standards for prison regulations restricting First Amendment interests59 and recognized the need to formulate a consistent standard of review.6" The Martinez Court held that a
regulation of inmate mail is justified only if the following criteria are satisfied:
First, the regulation or practice in question must further an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. Prison officials may not censor inmate correspondence simply to eliminate unflattering or unwelcome opinions or
factually inaccurate statements. Rather, they must show that a
regulation... furthers one or more of the substantial governmental
interests of security, order, and rehabilitation. Second, the limitation
of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary
or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest

Id. at 396 (alterations in original).
Specifically, the Court noted:
Some [federal courts] have maintained a hands-off posture in the face of
constitutional challenges to censorship of prisoner mail. Another [federal
court] has required only that censorship of personal correspondence not
lack support 'in any rational and constitutionally acceptable concept of a
prison system.' At the other extreme some courts have been willing to
require demonstration of a 'compelling state interest' to justify censorship
of prisoner mail .... And there are various intermediate positions, most
notably the view that a 'regulation . . . must be related both reasonably
and necessarily to the advancement of some justifiable purpose.'
Id. at 406-07 (citations omitted).
6 See id- at 407. Before announcing a new standard of review, however, the
Court noted that because inmate correspondence also involved parties outside of
prison, it was unnecessary to decide the extent to which prisoners, exclusively,
were able to claim First Amendment rights:
[T]he arguments of the parties reflect the assumption that the resolution
of this case requires an assessment of the extent to which prisoners may
claim First Amendment freedoms. In our view this inquiry is unnecessary. In determining the proper standard of review for prison restrictions
on inmate correspondence, we have no occasion to consider the extent to
which an individual's right to free speech survives incarceration, for a
narrower basis of decision is at hand.
Id. at 408. However, two months later, in Pell u. Procunier,417 U.S. 817 (1974),
the Court enunciated a general standard to be used in cases of restrictions on
prisoners' First Amendment rights. See Pell, 417 U.S. at 827.
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involved. Thus a restriction... that furthers an important or substantial interest of penal administration will nevertheless be invalid
if its sweep is unnecessarily broad.6

Applying this heightened scrutiny standard,6 2 the Court
found that the restrictions on prisoner mail were in no way
necessary to the furtherance of legitimate government interests because the California Department of Corrections failed to
show how statements in letters could possibly lead to flash riots.63 Additionally, the Department of Corrections failed to
specify what contribution the suppression of complaints in
letters made to the rehabilitation of criminals.' 4 "[Tihe
Department's regulations authorized censorship of prisoner
mail far broader than any legitimate interest of penal administration demands ....
66
Approximately two months later, in Pell v. Procunier,
the Court again faced the issue of the extent of First Amendment rights in the prison context. Pell involved a First Amendment challenge to a California Department of Corrections regulation that prohibited face-to-face "press and other media interviews with specific individual inmates."6 7 In rejecting the
inmates' First Amendment challenge to the ban on press and
media interviews and holding that the prison regulation did
not violate the constitutional rights of the prisoners" because

at 413-14.
See Abromovsky, supra note 5, at 245 (describing the Martinez test as a

61 Martinez, 416 U.S.
62

"two-pronged, intermediate scrutiny standard"); Andrea Bernstein, Free Exercise of
Religion in Prisons-The Right to Observe Dietary Laws, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 92,
108 (1976) (describing the Martinez test as an "important or substantial interest
test"); cf Lorijean Golichowski Dei, Note, The New Standard of Review for
Prisoners' Rights: A 'Turner' For the Worse?, 33 VILL. L. REV. 393, 414 (1988)
(describing the Martinez standard as one of "strict scrutiny").
" See Martinez, 416 U.S. at 416.
See id.
"

Id.

6' 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
67 Id. at 819.
66 See id. at 835.
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alternative means of communication were available,
Court stated:

489

9

the

Such considerations [of institutional security, administrative efficiency, and inmate rehabilitation] are peculiarly within the province
and professional expertise of corrections officials, and in the absence
of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials
have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts
should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters."

Notwithstanding the Court's adoption of what appeared to
be a reasonableness test,7 ' giving greater deference to prison
officials, at least one lower court appeared hesitant to give
greater deference to prison officials in the context of Jewish
dietary regulations. Less than one year after Pell, a New York
district court, in United States v. Kahane,72 considered for the
first time whether a Jewish prisoner was entitled to a kosher
diet,73 and in holding for the Jewish inmate, appeared to
adopt the Martinez heightened scrutiny standard.7 4

" Although the Court recognized that face-to-face meetings had inherent qualities, the Court "regard[ed] the available 'alternative means of (communication as) a
relevant factor' in a case such as this where 'we (are) called upon to balance First
Amendment rights against (legitimate) governmental interests.'" Id. at 824 (citation
omitted) (first alteration added). The Court noted that the alternative channels of
communication that were available to the prisoners included mail communication
and "limited visits from members of their families, the clergy, their attorneys, and
friends of prior acquaintance." Id. at 824-25.
70 Pell, 417 U.S. at 827. The Court did, however, caution that "[clourts
cannot,
of course, abdicate their constitutional responsibility to delineate and protect fundamental liberties." Id71 See Bernstein, supra note 62, at 101 ("[T]he reasonableness test received
new vitality in . . .Pell v. Procunier.");see also Dei, supra note 62, at 408 (noting
that "Pell differs from Martinez in that it does not discuss the least restrictive
alternative means requirement of Martinez").
72 396 F. Supp. 687 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
' See id. at 700 ("[We have found no cases deciding whether prison officials
are compelled to provide kosher food to Jewish prisoners.").
" Although not specifically stating that it was applying the Martinez test, the
court appeared to place the burden on prison officials. See id. at 703 (holding that
prison officials failed to show how providing a kosher diet would adversely affect
penological interests). Additionally, the court relied heavily on an examination of
the Muslim food cases, stating that those cases "require the least denigration of
the human spirit and mind consistent with the needs of a structured correctional
society. This balance is in general accord with the Supreme Court's recent discussion of the appropriate standard for First Amendment rights in the context of
prisons in Procunierv.Martinez." Id.
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Meir Kahane, an orthodox Jewish rabbi, was convicted of
violating probation and sentenced to one year in prison.75 Although the trial court ordered that Kahane "be placed in an
institution, and in a setting so that he can obtain... kosher
foods and (comply with) other religious requirements that he
may reasonably have,"76 the government denied him kosher
food, arguing, inter alia, that "it would be burdensome to meet
the religious dietary needs of its diverse prison population."77
Thus, Kahane brought an action in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York, seeking a kosher
diet.78
Relying on its examination of cases regarding Muslim
dietary requirements,79 the court held that "[Kahane] is constitutionally entitled to an order... that allows him to conform to Jewish dietary laws."" In reaching its decision, the
court reasoned that "[t]he government has shown no seri71 See id. at 689.

"' Kahane, 396 F. Supp. at 689 (alteration in original).
71 Id. at 690. The government argued that denying Jewish prisoners access to
a kosher diet was consistent with the Federal Bureau of Prisons policy that kosher food
'is not to be made available to the inmates on a routine basis. It has
been the Bureau's decision that administrative, financial, disciplinary, and
security problems which would be created by the offering of such food so
far outweigh the incidental burdens upon the practice of the inmates'
various religions as to preclude attempting to accommodate the dietary
needs of the diverse groups within the prison population.'
Id. at 692.
See id.
7 The court quoted Barnett v. Rogers, 410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969), a leading
case protecting the religious dietary requirements of Muslim prisoners:
"To say that religious freedom may undergo modification in a prison
environment is not to say that it can be suppressed or ignored without
adequate reason. And although 'within the prison society as well as without, the practice of religious beliefs is subject to reasonable regulations,
necessary for the protection and welfare of the community involved,' the
mere fact that government, as a practical matter, stands a better chance
of justifying a curtailment of fundamental liberties where prisoners are
involved does not eliminate the need for reasons imperatively justifying
the particular retraction of rights challenged at bar. Nor does it lessen
governmental responsibility to reduce the resulting impact upon those
rights to the fullest extent consistent with the justified objective."
Kahane, 396 F. Supp. at 700-01.
In addition to examining cases regarding the religious dietary requirements of
Muslim inmates, the court also relied on its interpretation of the importance of
Jewish dietary law. See id. at 690-94 (discussing importance of kosher food).
"o Id. at 704.
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ous, much less compelling, reasons why provision of a kosher diet for this [Jewish inmate] would affect prison security

or discipline."" l

In affirming the lower court's decision as modified," the
Second Circuit subjected the prison dietary policy to a heightened scrutiny standard' and held that "prison authorities are
proscribed by the constitutional status of religious freedom
from managing the institution in a manner which unnecessarily prevents Kahane's observance of his dietary obligations."'
Despite the Second Circuit's move in Kahane towards a
more prisoner-friendly standard, the Supreme Court continued
its trend of according greater deference to prison officials and
taking a restrictive view of prisoners' retained constitutional
rights. In Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union,
Inc.,' the Court examined prison regulations that prohibited
meetings of a prisoners' labor union, "inmate solicitation of
other inmates, meetings between members of the Union, and
bulk mailings concerning the Union from outside sources."8 6 In
upholding the prison regulations, the Court appeared to apply a rational basis standard of review. 7 The Court noted:

81 Id.

at 703. But see United States v. Huss, 394 F. Supp. 752, 761 (S.D.N.Y.

1975), vacated, 520 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1975) (giving substantial deference to prison
officials and holding that Jewish prisoners had no constitutional right to be provided kosher food).
82 See Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492, 496 (2d Cir. 1975) (modifying lower
court's order to ensure that specific items of kosher diet are left to discretion of
prison officials).
Although the court refused to decide whether constraints on inmates' First
Amendment rights must be justified by the Martinez "important or substantial
interest" standard, see id. at 495 ("[W]e need not decide whether restrictions on
prisoners' First Amendment rights need be justified by an 'important or substantial government interest' or by . . . a 'compelling government interest.'), it is evident that some form of a heightened scrutiny standard was adopted, "keep[ing] the
burden of justification upon the government." Bernstein, supra note 62, at 107.
84 Kahane, 527 F.2d at 495.
g' 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
8

Id. at 122.

"7See id. at 130 ("An examination of the potential restrictions on speech or
association that have been imposed by the regulations . . . demonstrates that the
restrictions imposed are reasonable, and are consistent with the inmates' status as
prisoners and with the legitimate operational considerations of the institution.");
see also Dei, supra note 62, at 409 ("The Jones Court's analysis appeared to minimally balance interests by applying a rational basis standard of review which
emphasized deference to prison officials and the incompatibility of the exercise of
certain rights and incarceration.").
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The District Court... got off on the wrong foot... by not giving
appropriate deference to the decisions of prison administrators and
appropriate recognition to the peculiar and restrictive circumstances
of penal confinement. While litigation by prison inmates concerning
conditions of confinement.., is of recent vintage, this Court has
long recognized that "(1)awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.
The fact of confinement and the needs of the penal institution impose limitations on constitutional rights, including those derived
from the First Amendment ....88

The Court further emphasized that the burden was not on the
prison officials "to show affirmatively that the Union would be
'detrimental to proper penological objectives' or would constitute a 'present danger to security and order."'89 Absent a
showing that the prison officials' beliefs regarding increased
danger and chaos were unreasonable,' the prisoners' constitutional challenges had to be rejected.9
Several years later, in Bell v. Wolfish,92 the Court again
applied a rational basis standard of review to a Federal Bureau of Prisons rule that prohibited inmates' "receipt of hardback books unless mailed directly from publishers, book clubs,
or bookstores."" In upholding the regulation, the Court noted
that the prison officials did not "exaggerate[] their response" to
security problems; rather, the restriction was a "rational response... to an obvious security problem."94 Absent an overly
broad regulation, therefore, the Court determined that it
should "defer to [corrections officials'] expert judgment."95

88

Jones, 433 U.S. at 125 (citations omitted) (alteration in original).

89 Id. at 128.
9 See id. at 127-28.

9' See id. at 136.
9 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
93

Id. at 550.

" Id. The Court noted that "[it hardly needs to be emphasized that hardback
books are especially serviceable for smuggling contraband into an institution; money, drugs, and weapons easily may be secreted in the bindings. They are also
difficult to search effectively." Id.
9'Id. at 548. The Court noted that considerations of internal order and discipline and the maintenance of institutional security are "'peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials.'" Bell, 441 U.S. at 547-48
(quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)).
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An examination of the lower courts' treatment of religious
dietary regulations reveals, nevertheless, that Jones's and
Bell's bark was worse than their bite for Jewish prisoners
trying to obtain kosher diets. Despite the Supreme Court's
statement that the standards of review in Jones and Bell were
not heightened scrutiny standards," it appears that, during
this time period, the lower courts, in construing the foregoing
Supreme Court decisions, have generally applied some form of
an intermediate level scrutiny standard of review to prison
regulations," specifically those restricting Jewish prisoners'
access to kosher food. Interestingly, the trend in the lower
courts, even after Jones and Bell, was that Jewish prisoners
were generally able to procure kosher diets.9"
For example, in Prushinowski v. Hambrick,99 an Orthodox
Jewish inmate at a federal correctional institute in North Carolina petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that prison officials "failed to provide
him with facilities and foods in order that he may observe the
Jewish dietary laws." 10 Before determining whether prison

" See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 87 (1987) ("In none of these ...
'prisoners' rights' cases did the Court apply a standard of heightened scrutiny, but
instead inquired whether a prison regulation that burdens fundamental rights is
'reasonably related' to legitimate penological objectives, or whether it represents an
'exaggerated response' to those concerns.").
" See Abramovsky, supra note 5, at 246 ("Since none of these cases [referring
to Jones, Bell, and Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984)] expressly overruled
Martinez, federal courts . . . continued to apply the intermediate scrutiny test for
restrictions on the First Amendment rights of inmates . . . ."); Zogry, supra note
8, at 912 ("The burden of proving religious curtailment was shifted from the pris").
oner . . . to the prison officials . .
",See, e.g., Theodore v. Coughlin, No. 83 Civ. 6668, 1986 WL 11456 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 7, 1986) (deprivation of kosher diet for first three weeks of incarceration
violated inmate's First Amendment rights); Prushinowski v. Hambrick, 570 F.
Supp. 863 (E.D.N.C. 1983) (holding that Jewish inmate has First Amendment right
to kosher diet); Schlesinger v. Carlson, 489 F. Supp. 612 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (Orthodox Jewish inmate who followed laws of kashruth entitled to hot plate and access
to separate area of prison to prepare his meals during Passover holiday); see also
Abramovsky, supra note 5, at 265 ("In contrast to difficulties they have had in
securing the right to observe certain other religious practices, Jewish prisoners
have been largely successful in obtaining kosher food."); Zogry, supra note 8, at
912 ("[C]ases show the law favoring prisoners in issues regarding the Free Exercise protection of rights involving the kosher laws.").
" 570 F. Supp. 863 (E.D.N.C. 1983).
10 Id. at 863. The inmate alleged that the prison officials' failure to provide a
kosher diet caused him to become ill. See id.
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officials were required to provide a kosher diet, the court stated that "[a] prisoner's predilection to practice his religion may
be restricted only upon convincing showing that paramount
state interests so require." 1 ' In addition, the prison regulation "must be 'reasonably and substantially justified by considerations of prison discipline and order' and must be the
least restrictive alternative available."'0 2 Essentially, the
court determined that it was required to balance the
Jewish inmate's First Amendment rights with prison security and discipline.0 3
Relying on Kahane, the court stated that "the burden falls
on the prison officials to prove that the food available to a
religious inmate is consistent with his dietary laws and provides adequate nourishment." 4 The prison officials, however,
failed to satisfy that burden." 5 Therefore, the court held that
the Jewish inmate should be provided with the requested kosher diet "so that he will not be required to sacrifice his religious beliefs in order to maintain his health. The First Amendment requires as much."0 6
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court decisions since Martinez, ' 7 Jewish prisoners, between 1974 and 1987, have had
general success in procuring kosher diets. This result was due

.01Id.

at 866 (citing Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972)).

" Id. (citation omitted). Although the court made no mention of Martinez, it
appeared to adopt Martinez's "least restrictive alternative means" requirement. See
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413-14 (1974), overruled by Thornburgh v.
Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989) ("[Tlhe limitation of First Amendment freedoms must
be no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular
governmental interest involved.").
"03See Prushinowski, 570 F. Supp. at 866.
104Id.
10" The prison presented various reasons as to why they should not have been

required to provide Prushinowski with the kosher food he requested. First, the
officials argued that the First Amendment required that they only provide kosher
food that is acceptable to other Jewish inmates and that Prushinowski's requests
were peculiar. See id. at 867. Second, the prison officials argued that providing the
requested kosher food would create security problems. See id. at 868. Finally, the
officials contended that it would be too costly to provide Prushinowski with his requested kosher food. See id. The court determined, however, that none of these
arguments were effective. See Prushinowski, 570 F. Supp. at 867.
Id. at 867.
107 For a discussion of Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974), Jones v. North
Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977), and Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520 (1979), see supra Part II.A.
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to the lower courts' application of some form of a heightened
scrutiny standard of review, placing the burden of proving religious curtailment on prison officials. As a result of the Supreme Court decisions of Turner v. Safley0 5 and OLone v.
Estate of Shabazz, 1°9 however, this trend soon changed.11
B. A New Trend in Jurisprudence:Turner v. Safley/O'Lone v.
Estate of Shabazz and Their Adverse Effect on Jewish
Prisoners'Attempts to ProcureKosher Diets
In Turner v. Safley,"' inmates brought a class action
challenging the constitutionality of two prison regulations
enacted by the Missouri Division of Corrections." 2 In determining whether the prison restrictions were constitutional, the
United States Supreme Court began its analysis by stating
that the lower courts incorrectly decided that Martinez and
subsequent Court decisions "require the application of a strict
scrutiny standard of review for resolving [inmates'] constitutional complaints.""' The Court, in deciding what standard of

1- 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
'0 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
11' See Zogry, supra note 8, at 917-18 ("Turner reversed the law that governed
prisoners for over a decade, and began a new trend in the jurisprudence that
would adversely affect Orthodox Jewish prisoners.").
111482 U.S. 78 (1987).
112 See id.
at 78. Specifically, the first regulation "permit[ted] correspondence between immediate family members who [were] inmates at different institutions
within the Division's jurisdiction, and between inmates 'concerning legal matters,'
but allow[ed] other inmate correspondence only if each inmate's classification/treatment team deem[ed] it in the best interest of the parties." Id. The second
prison regulation "permit[ted] an inmate to marry only with the prison
superintendent's permission, which c[ould] be given only when there [were] 'compelling reasons' to do so." Id.
" Id. Pursuant to Martinez, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit decided that the prison regulations could be justified "'only if [they] further[] an
important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of
expression, and the limitation is no greater than necessary or essential to protect
that interest.'" Turner, 482 U.S. at 83 (quoting Safley v. Turner, 777 F.2d 1307,
1310 (8th Cir. 1985)). Although the Eighth Circuit recognized that "Martinez had
expressly reserved the question of the appropriate standard of review based on
inmates' constitutional claims," it nevertheless believed that application of the
Martinez standard was proper. Id. at 87. Based on the Martinez standard, the
court of appeals held that the regulations were not the least restrictive means of
achieving the rehabilitation and security goals of the prison. See Turner, 777 F.2d
at 1315-16.
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review was proper, summarized its decisions dealing with
prison regulations subsequent to Martinez; specifically, Pell,
Jones, and Bell."4 "If Pell, Jones, and Bell have not already
resolved the question posed in Martinez, we resolve it now:
when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional
rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests.""5
The Court enunciated a four-factor test to determine
whether a prison regulation is reasonable:
First, there must be a "valid, rational connection" between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward
to justify it .... A second factor.., is whether there are alternative
means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates.
Where "other avenues" remain available for the exercise of the asserted right, courts should be particularly conscious of the "measure
of judicial deference owed to corrections officials... in gauging the
validity of the regulation. A third consideration is the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards
and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally .... Finally, the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the
reasonableness of a prison regulation. By the same token, the existence of obvious, easy alternatives may be evidence that the regulation is not6 reasonable, but is an "exaggerated response" to prison
concerns."

Applying this new four-part test, the Court upheld the
inmate correspondence regulation, deciding that it was reasonably related to the goals of institutional safety and security."7 The marriage regulation, however, was not reasonably
See Turner, 482 U.S. at 86-87.
..Id. at 89. The Court believed that a "reasonable relation" standard was
required if "'prison administrators ... , and not the courts, [are] to make the
difficult judgments concerning institutional operations.'" Id. (citation omitted). Subjecting prison regulations to a rigid strict scrutiny standard, however, would have
detrimental effects on prison administration. Such a standard
would seriously hamper [prison officials'] ability to anticipate security
problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of
prison administration. The rule would also distort the decisionmaking
process, for every administrative judgment would be subject to the possibility that some court somewhere would conclude that it had a less restrictive way of solving the problem at hand. Courts inevitably would
become the primary arbiters of what constitutes the best solution to
every administrative problem ....
Id.
n6 Id. at 89-90 (citations omitted).
1
See Turner, 482 U.S. at 93.
114
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and security concerns, and thus,
related to rehabilitation
18
was unconstitutional.
On the same day as the Turner decision, the Court was
required, in OLone v. Estate of Shabazz," to apply its new
four-part standard to claims specifically involving the free
exercise of religion. In OLone, Muslim prisoners brought suit
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging a New Jersey prison
regulation which prevented them from attending Jumu'ah, a
weekly religious service. 2 '
The Court, applying the Turner factors, held that the prison regulation was reasonably related to the penological objectives of institutional security and order,' 2 ' and thus, did not
violate the Muslim inmates' First Amendment rights.'2 2 Further, the Court determined that the prisoners had alternative
means of expressing their religion."'
Thus, in Turner and OLone, the Court made it quite clear
that prison regulations curtailing constitutional rights were
not to be reviewed under any type of heightened scrutiny standard. Whereas in prior cases prison officials were required to
explain the constitutionality of their regulations, the TurnerIO'Lone four-part test shifted the burden of proof to
the prisoner. 24
Applying the Turner/OLone test, lower courts seemed
more willing than ever to deny Jewish prisoners' requests for

1"

See id. at 97-98.

.. 482
120 See
121 See
1
See

U.S. 342 (1987).
id. at 345.
id. at 350.
id. at 345.

12 See id. at 351-52. The Court recognized that there existed no alternative
means of attending Jumu'ah. See O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 351. The Court stated, however:
While we in no way minimize the central importance of Jumu'ah to [the
inmates], we are unwilling to hold that prison officials are required by
the Constitution to sacrifice legitimate penological objectives to that end.
In Turner, we did not look to see whether prisoners had other means of
communicating with fellow inmates, but instead examined whether the
inmates were deprived of "all means of expression." Here, similarly, we
think it appropriate to see whether under these regulations [the inmates]
retain the ability to participate in other Muslim religious ceremonies.
Id. at 351-52. The Court then noted that Muslim prisoners were served pork-alternative meals and that "special arrangements" were made during Ramadan, a
month-long period of prayer and fasting. Id. at 352.
1

See Zogry, supra note 8, at 920.
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kosher diets.'2 5 In Cooper v. Rogers,'2 6 for example, an Orthodox Jewish inmate unsuccessfully brought an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that the Maryland Penitentiary refused to provide him with a kosher breakfast in violation
In determining whether
of his First Amendment rights.'
the prison regulation was valid, the court stated that the inmate "has no right to a specially prepared kosher breakfast as
long as [the prison officials'] denial of such a breakfast bears a
reasonable relationship to their legitimate penological
goals."2 Applying the Turner standard, the court upheld the
prison regulation, finding that the regulation was rationally
related to the prison officials' budgetary concerns.' 29 Furthermore, the court noted that there existed reasonable alternatives for the inmate to practice his religion.'

12 See, e.g., Holterman v. Helling, 70 F.3d 1276 (8th Cir. 1995) (prison policy of

refusing to provide kosher food to observant Jewish inmate rationally related to
prison's economic and administrative concerns); Ben-Avhraham v. Moses, 1 F.3d
1246 (9th Cir. 1993) (same); Cooper v. Rogers, 788 F. Supp. 255 (D. Md. 1991)

(same).
Jewish prisoners did achieve some success in procuring kosher diets, but this
success was due to the fact that at least one court continued to rely on Kahane,
and was unwilling to apply the Turner/O'Lone standard. See Bass v. Coughlin, 976
F.2d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 1992) (per curiam) ("At least as early as 1975, it was established that prison officials must provide a prisoner a diet that is consistent with
his religious scruples. Kahane has never been overruled and remains the law. The
principle it established was not placed in any reasonable doubt by intervening
.
Supreme Court rulings in OLone and Turner ...
12 788 F. Supp. 255 (D. Md. 1991).
12 See id. at 256.
'
Id. at 258 (applying Turner and O'Lone standard). The inmate urged the
court to use a constitutional standard more deferential to prisoners, specifically the
Kahane or Prushinowski standard. See id. at 258 n.8. The court stated, however,
that "despite their factual relevance to this case, Kahane and Prushinowski can
place no greater obligation on [the prison officials] than do Turner and O'Lone."
Id.
12 See Cooper, 788 F. Supp. at 260. The court noted that:
A specially ordered breakfast for [the inmate] would cost between $2.50
and $5.00, compared with approximately $.50 if [the inmate] ate...
items already available at breakfast. Additionally, a pre-packaged kosher
breakfast unlike lunch and dinner, can only be ordered from a caterer in
New York. These costs cannot be dismissed as de minimis, particularly in
light of the impact which providing [the inmate] with special treatment
might have upon the state's duty to provide similar treatment for inmates of other religions.
Id. (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987)).
1
See id. at 259 ("[EIven if the kosher breakfast is not available, [the inmate]
purchas[e] from the commissary breakfast foods which meet his kosher
can ...
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Another case illustrating the courts' seemingly eager willingness under TurnerO'Lone to deny Jewish inmates' requests
for kosher diets is Ben-Avraham v. Moses."' In BenAvraham, a Hasidic Jewish prisoner brought suit against an
Alaska state prison, contending that the prison officials' refusal
to provide his requested kosher diet violated his First Amendment rights.'32 The Ben-Avraham court began its analysis
with the recognition that "[i]nmates... have the right to be
provided with food sufficient to sustain them in good health
that satisfies the dietary laws of their religion.""3 Applying
the TurnerO'Lone test, however, the court stated that the
prison officials' decision not to provide the inmate with his requested kosher diet was reasonably related to legitimate
penological concerns, and thus, upheld the regulation.' In
determining the reasonableness of the regulation, the court
noted that the cost of the inmate's requested kosher meals was
nearly three times as much as the cost of regular prison
meals 3 ' and that the requested kosher meals were difficult
to prepare, detrimentally affecting the prison staffs "duty to
oversee the rest of the prison population." 6 Further, the
court stated that providing the inmate with his requested diet

standards. While Turner and OLone specify alternative means of observance as an
indication of reasonableness, neither opinion states that such an alternative must

be state-subsidized.).
131 1 F.3d 1246, No. 92-35604, 1993 WL 269611 (9th Cir. July 19, 1993) (unpublished disposition).
1
See id. at *1. Because of the prison's failure to provide his requested kosher
diet, the inmate went on hunger strikes, lost a significant amount of weight and,
for a time period, was placed in medical segregation. See id.
13 Id. (citing McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 198 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curi-

am)).

13 See id. at *3.
13

See Ben-Avraharm, 1993 WL 269611, at *2.
Specifically, the inmate insisted that

13 Id.

his food be stored, cooked and served separately from all other food and
that special kosher pots, dishes, and utensils be used. He insisted that
his food be opened in his presence because he didn't trust the kitchen
staff not to contaminate his food. Finally, different pans, dishes, and
utensils had to be used for different foods.
Id. at *3 n.3.
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"could lead to a proliferation of special diet requests, and to resentment by other prisoners and disruption of the administration of prison food service or prison discipline."" 7 Moreover,
the inmate had alternative ways to practice his religion."'
Evidently, the Supreme Court decisions in Turner and
O'Lone represented a turn for the worse for Jewish prisoners
attempting to obtain kosher diets. 39 "With the heavy burden
on the prisoner to show that his rights had been greatly circumscribed, the courts were reluctant to find constitutional
violations. The new 'rational relation to legitimate penological
interests' test effectively validated any prison regulation.""'
This trend came to a screeching halt, however, when Congress, in 1993,
enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration
14 1
Act ("RFRA").
42
C. The Religious Freedom RestorationAct: A "StrongAlly"
For Jewish Prisonersin Their FightAgainst Turner/O'Lone

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act explicitly created a
"compelling state interest" standard to be applied in all free
exercise cases, 4 including those cases brought by prison-

13 Id.
13

at *2.
For example, the Jewish prisoner "had a prayer shawl, had access to a rab-

bi, was provided special food at Passover, and was allowed to wear a yarmulke in
his living module." Id.
139 See generally Zogry, supra note 8, at 917-33 (discussing Turner and its dramatic effect on Jewish prisoners).
1" Zogry, supra note 8, at 927.
141 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994), invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997).
1
Zogry, supra note 8, at 935.
1
RFRA provides:
(a) In general. Government shall not substantially burden a person's
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Exception. Government may substantially burden a person's exercise
of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the

person(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
(c)Judicial relief. A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in
violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense
in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government. Standing to assert a claim or defense under this section shall be
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ers.' Although it was "unclear... what effect the RFRA
had on the O'Lone [and Turner] standard,"'4 5 one thing was
certain: during the three years that RFRA was the law, " 6
courts strictly scrutinized prison regulations that curtailed
Jewish prisoners' First Amendment rights to a kosher diet. 47
In Ward v. Walsh, 4" for example, an Orthodox Jewish
prisoner in a Nevada state prison brought suit against prison
officials, arguing that their refusal to provide him with a kosher diet violated his First Amendment free exercise
The court determined that, under the Turnrights.'
erIO'Lone standard, the prison dietary policy was rationally
related to legitimate governmental interests, 50 but neverthegoverned by the general rules of standing under article III of the Constitution.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1; see also Braunstein, supra note 2, at 2355-64 (general discussion of RFRA); Zogry, supra note 8, at 933-35 (same).
1" See Braunstein, supra note 2, at 2358-60 (discussing the debate surrounding
the applicability of RFRA to prisoners); see also Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948,
949 (9th Cir. 1995) ("The purpose of the RFRA is 'to restore the compelling interest test . . . in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.'
Given this broad purpose, it is clear that the RFRA applies to prisoners' claims.").
" Braunstein, supra note 2, at 2360. Although RFRA's effect on the Turner/O'Lone "rational relation" test is unclear, House and Senate Reports pertaining
to RFRA suggest that the TurnerO'Lone standard was weakened, or perhaps even
overturned. "As applied in the prison and jail context, the intent of the act is to
restore the traditional protection afforded to prisoners to observe their religions
which was weakened by the decision in O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz." S.R. No.
111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-11 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 18981901; see also H.R. Rep. No. 88, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1993).
"' Approximately three years after the passage of RFRA, the Supreme Court
decided, in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), that the Act was unconstitutional. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 512.
147 See Braunstein, supra note 2, at 2362 ("As a result [of RFRA], courts evaluating Jewish prisoners' free exercise claims found that the claims should be evaluated by a much stricter standard than had been used during the Turner era.").
Not every court during the RFRA era, however, held that prison dietary regulations infringed upon Jewish prisoners' First Amendment rights. See, e.g., Best v.
Kelly, 879 F. Supp. 305, 308-09 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that Jewish prisoner did
not request kosher diet primarily for religious purposes and, applying the RFRA
standard, held that "refusing to provide [plaintiff] with an alternative diet for a
short time period [did not] substantially burden[ plaintiffs exercise of his religion"); Holterman v. Helling, No. 94-3113, 1995 WL 702300 (8th Cir. Nov. 30,
1995) (unpublished disposition) (declining to consider Jewish prisoner's free exercise
claim under RFRA standard because prisoner failed to amend complaint to allege
RFRA violation, and holding that, under pre-RFRA standards, Jewish prisoner not
entitled to kosher diet).
'4,1 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 1993).
149 See id. at 876.
"' See id. at 877 (legitimate interest in running simplified food service logically
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less, remanded the case because the district court failed to
consider the other TurnerO'Lone factors."' After the case
was remanded, but prior to the district court's evidentiary
hearing regarding the other TurnerlO'Lone factors, RFRA was
enacted.'52 The district court, nevertheless, pursuant to the
Ninth Circuit's instructions, applied the Turner/O'Lone test
and upheld the prison regulations."' The Jewish inmate appealed, and considering the case for a second time, the Ninth
Circuit reversed the district court's decision. 54
Jewish prisoners were successful in procuring kosher diets
during the RFRA era even when courts did not explicitly apply
the strict RFRA standard. In Ashelman v. Wawrzaszek,"5 ' for
example, an Orthodox Jewish prisoner in an Arizona state
prison brought suit against prison officials, challenging the
prison's policy of furnishing Jewish prisoners with one frozen
TV-style kosher meal supplemented with nonkosher pork-free
or vegetarian meals. 5 ' The Jewish inmate contended that his
First Amendment claim should be analyzed under the strict
RFRA standard.'57 The prison officials, on the other hand,
argued, inter alia, that RFRA was unconstitutional. 5 '
The court declined to consider whether RFRA was controlling, but nevertheless, concluded that "the magistrate judge
failed to take alternatives into consideration that are disposi-

related to dietary regulation).
...See id. at 879 (remanding the case "so that the district court can make
specific factual findings and can engage in a careful balancing of all the Turner
factors").
152 See Ward v. Walsh, 76 F.3d 390, 390 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting passage of
RFRA prior to district court's evidentiary hearing).
15. See id. (noting that district court entered supplemental findings of fact and
conclusions of law upholding prison dietary regulations).
...See id. (holding that since RFRA "altered the standard for analyzing
prisoners' free exercise of religion claims," case must be reversed and remanded so
that district court could apply RFRA).
' 111 F.3d 674 (9th Cir. 1997).
156 See id. at 675.
'5' See id. at 676.
.58See id. at 677. At the time of Ashelman, the issue of the constitutionality of
RFRA was heavily debated. See, e.g., Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522 (9th
Cir. 1997); Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018 (7th Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Catholic
University, 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352
(5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 293 (1996). The Supreme Court, in City
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), ultimately decided that RFRA was unconstitutional. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 512.
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tive in shifting the balance in [the inmate's] favor even under
the more lenient test of O'Lone and Turner." 59 The court noted that the existence of alternatives "shows that the policy is
unreasonable" 60 and held that "the prison must provide a
diet sufficient to sustain [the Jewish inmate] in good health
without violating the laws of kashruth."'6 '
D. Post-RFRA: UncertainResults For Jewish Prisoners
The protection RFRA afforded Jewish prisoners vanished

when the Supreme Court, in City of Boerne v. Flores,'16 2 held

that the Act was unconstitutional on the grounds that Congress had exceeded its constitutional authority.'63 As a result
of the Boerne decision, courts once again turned to the Turner/O'Lone standard when evaluating Jewish prisoners' free
exercise claims."6
...See Ashelman, 111 F.3d at 677. The trial court based its decision on the
pre-RFRA standards of TurnerO'Lone and held that the prison dietary policy was
constitutional "in light of the prison's legitimate penological concerns about cost
and favoritism." Id. at 676.
* Id. at 678. The court stated:
Tihe record in this case does permit us to determine that reasonable
alternatives to the prison's policy of providing one frozen kosher TV-dinner, supplemented with vegetarian or nonpork meals, do exist. The warden virtually concedes that [the inmate's] kosher TV-dinner could be
supplemented with whole fruits, vegetables, nuts, and cereals that are
not tough to come by .... The evidence shows that disposable utensils
are also available, at modest cost .... And the warden himself proposed

a program that would have substantially satisfied [the inmate'sl dietary
requirements, but which for some reason wasn't pursued. The evidence
also shows that the prison accommodates the dietary requirements of
other religious groups . . .without disruption.

Id.
161Id.
2 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
16 See id. at 536. In deciding that RFRA was unconstitutional, the Court stated:
It is for Congress in the first instance to "determine whether and what
legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment," and its conclusions are entitled to much deference. Congress' discretion is not unlimited, however, and the courts retain the power, as
they have since Marbury u. Madison, to determine if Congress has exceeded it authority under the Constitution. Broad as the power of Congress is under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of
powers and the federal balance.
Id.(citation omitted).
16 See, e.g., Johnson v. Horn, 150 F.3d 276, 282 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding in a
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Several courts applying the Turner/OLone standard in the
post-RFRA era seem willing to grant extreme deference to
prison officials and their dietary regulations.16 5 In Cooper v.
Lanham,66 for example, the court, applying the Turner/O'Lone test, held that the Maryland Department of
Correction's ("MDOC") refusal to provide an Orthodox Jewish
inmate a kosher diet was reasonably related to promoting
legitimate penological interests, and thus, did not violate the
inmate's First Amendment rights. 167 The court noted, inter
alia, that: (1) MDOC had a legitimate interest in running a
simplified food system; 16 (2) providing Jewish inmates kosher meals would have a significant impact on other inmates,
prison officials, and prison resources; 69 and (3) there were
no ready alternatives to the dietary regulations that would
fully accommodate the Jewish inmate's rights at a de
minimis cost. 7 °
post-Boerne case that the appropriate standard to evaluate the validity of prison
regulations that curtail First Amendment rights is the Turner standard); Beerheide
v. Zavaras, 997 F. Supp. 1405, 1411 (D. Colo. 1998) ("To determine the likelihood
of plaintiffs prevailing on the merits of their First Amendment claim [to a kosher
diet], [the court will] apply the pre-RFRA standards set forth in Turner v.
Safley."); see also Braunstein, supra note 2, at 2367 ("[Tjhe Boerne decision led
many courts to resort to the low-level standard of Turner that grants deference to
prison administration, which had been largely unused during the three years that
the RFRA was the law.").
"6 This deference to prison administration is no different than that given by
the courts when Turner and OLone were first decided. See supra Part II.B.
16 145 F.3d 1323, No. 97-7183, 1998 WL 230913 (4th Cir. May 7, 1998) (unpublished disposition).
" See id. at *3.
.. See id. at *1 ("MDOC's food services program is designed to allow mass production of food and . . . it is economically and administratively unable to accommodate the special dietary requests of the over forty religious groups represented
in the inmate population.").
169 See id. at *2. Specifically, the court stated:
The cost of providing kosher meals to Jewish . . . inmates is significant.
In addition, ...
providing [the inmate] with a kosher diet will prompt
other inmates of different religious denominations to make similar requests. MDOC cannot afford to honor these requests, and providing special diets to some inmates and not to others would violate the prison's
religious directives which is to treat all religions equitably.
Id. at *2 (citations omitted).
'" See Cooper, 1998 WL 230913, at *2.
Although the record indicated that a
Jewish organization was willing to provide pre-packaged frozen kosher meals or, in
the alternative, provide volunteers to prepare kosher meals in the prison kitchen,
the court gave great deference to the prison officials' arguments that "the already
strained kitchen facilities at MDOC are not equipped to handle the preparation
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Similarly, in Johnson v. Horn,'' the court, applying the
Turner/O'Lone standard to an Orthodox Jewish prisoner's
claim that he had a constitutional right to hot kosher meals,
held that "the cold kosher diet currently being provided passes
constitutional muster because it is sufficient to keep the Inmates in good health." 2 Balancing the Turner/O'Lone factors, the court noted, inter alia, that: (1) the Pennsylvania prison had a legitimate interest in running a simplified food system; and (2) the inmates' request for hot kosher meals "created
legitimate security concerns, including bringing additional
foods from new sources into the Prison and the possible belief
by other inmates that [the Jewish inmates] are receiving
special treatment."'
Application of the Turner/O'Lone test in the post-RFRA era
does not, however, always lead to an automatic victory for
4
prison officials. In Beerheide v. Zavaras, for example, three
Orthodox Jewish inmates brought suit against a Colorado state
prison, seeking a preliminary injunction forcing the prison to
7
provide them with a kosher diet. ' The Colorado Department
of Corrections offered three legitimate penological goals to

and storage of special meals, there are hidden costs associated with [the Jewish
inmate's] suggestions, and that [the inmate's] suggestions do not address MDOC's
broader concern of treating all inmates in a uniform manner." Id.
171 150 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 1998).
a hot kosher
172 Id. at 283. Although the prison was not required to provide
diet, the court did hold, however, that Jewish inmates were entitled to a "diet
sufficient to sustain them in good health without violating the kosher laws." Id.
Id. at 282. Interestingly, the court also noted that although the prison offi1
cials asserted cost as a legitimate justification for denying the Jewish inmates'
request for hot kosher food, providing hot kosher meals would cost less than the
prisoners' current cold kosher diet. See id. at 283. The court further stated, however.
The cost factor, which might suggest a certain arbitrariness on the part
of prison officials could be given some weight were we free to apply the
state regulation requiring "reasonable accommodations for dietary restrictions." However, it is not our function to look to such sources in circumstances like those presented here. As Turner makes clear, we are to
avoid "unnecessarily perpetuating the involvement of the federal courts in
the affairs of prison administration."
Johnson, 150 F.3d at 283 (citations omitted).
17

997 F. Supp. 1405 (D. Colo. 1998).
i&. at 1408.

175 See

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65: 2

justify its policy of refusing to provide kosher diets: (1) financial concerns; (2) security considerations; and (3) the prolifera176
tion of other lawsuits.
In determining whether the prison's dietary regulation
was constitutional, the court stated that although "[elach concern is legitimate in the abstract[,J ...the nexus between the
prison dietary policy and the correctional goals is too tenuous
to withstand scrutiny." 177 Thus, the prison officials were required to provide the Jewish inmates with a kosher diet. 17
III. ANALYSIS
Although the standards used by the courts during the past
25 years vary in their degree of scrutiny, some offering more
protection to Jewish prisoners than others, 79 the standards
176 See id. at 1412.

Id.

The court scrutinized each proffered correctional goal: First, the court
stated that the prison officials' cost concerns were without merit because "mathematically speaking, the actual annual cost of providing these three inmates with
kosher meals . . . must be regarded as a minuscule portion of the Food Services'
annual budget." Id. Thus, the prison officials did not explain "why providing plaintiffs with kosher TV dinners would not accommodate plaintiffs' request at a de
minimis cost." Beerheide, 997 F. Supp. at 1413. Second, the prison officials presented no evidence to support their position that giving Jewish inmates kosher
meals would present security problems. See id. at 1412. Third,
[tihe concern of proliferation of lawsuits seeking various accommodations
is speculative at best. Moreover, to deny these plaintiffs their right to
observe a central tenet of their religion on the ground that it might lead
to other lawsuits is specious. The DOC's logic would effectively preclude
provision of any accommodations for religious practices in prison ....
To
deny plaintiffs their right to free exercise of their sincerely held religious
beliefs because it might lead to other inmates filing lawsuits is unreasonable.
Id.
178See id. at 1413. Although not specifically mentioned, the
Beerheide court,
interestingly enough, appeared to place the burden of proving the validity of the
dietary regulation on the prison officials. This is contrary to other court decisions
applying the Turner/O'Lone standard. See supra Part II.B and accompanying notes.
In addition, Beerheide appears to be the first case in the post-RFRA era to question the relationship between penological interests and prison dietary regulations,
requiring prison officials to offer actual evidence, not mere speculation, that providing kosher diets will compromise penological interests. Thus, Beerheide may
prove to be an extremely significant case for Jewish inmates attempting to obtain
kosher diets in the future.
179 Compare, e.g., United States v. Kahane, 396 F. Supp. 687, 704
(E.D.N.Y.)
(applying heightened scrutiny test to prison dietary regulations and holding that
Jewish inmate constitutionally entitled to diet that conforms to laws of kashruth),
177

1999]

JEWISH PRISONERS AND THEIR RIGHT TO A KOSHER MEAL

507

neither adequately nor consistently protect Jewish prisoners'
8
First Amendment rights to a kosher diet. ' Each standard,
in one way or another, attempts to weigh Jewish prisoners'
rights against the penological interests of prison administration. Notwithstanding the fact that a number of courts have
held that prison officials must "accommodate the right of [Jewish] prisoners to receive diets consistent with their religious
scruples," 1 ' other courts have upheld prison kosher dietary

with Cooper v. Rogers, 788 F. Supp. 255, 259-60 (D. Md. 1991) (applying deferential TurnerlO'Lone test and upholding kosher dietary regulations), and Ward v.
Walsh, 76 F.3d 390, 390 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that RFRA "altered the standard
for analyzing prisoners' free exercise of religion claims," and holding in favor of
Jewish inmate).
"' Arguably, even an inmate-friendly standard does not afford adequate protection. See Comment, The Religious Rights of the Incarcerated, 125 U. PA. L. REV.
812, 842-45, 866-67 (1977) [hereinafter Religious Rights] (discussing and critiquing
inmate-friendly Martinez test); see also Cooper v. Rogers, 788 F. Supp. 255 (D.
Md. 1991). In Cooper, the Jewish inmate urged the court to apply a constitutional
standard more favorable to prisoners, as opposed to the deferential TurnerlO'Lone
standard. See id. at 258 n.8. Specifically, the inmate urged the court to apply the
Kahane or Prushinowski standard. See id. The court stated, however, that "despite
their factual relevance to this case, Kahane and Prushinowski can place no greater
obligation on [the prison officials] than do Turner and O'Lone." Id.
The standards do not consistently protect Jewish inmates' rights to a kosher
diet either. Compare, e.g., Beerheide v. Zavaras, 997 F. Supp. 1405 (D. Colo. 1998)
(applying TurnerlO'Lone test and holding in favor of Jewish inmate), with BenAvraham v. Moses, 1 F.3d 1246, No. 92-35604, 1993 WL 269611 (9th Cir. July 19,
1993) (unpublished disposition) (applying TurnerlO'Lone test and upholding prison
dietary regulations). See generally Bernstein, supra note 62 (discussing standards
by which freedoms in prison are evaluated and noting inconsistencies in federal
courts with regard to inmates' right to religious diets).
Although the standards neither adequately nor consistently protect Jewish
inmates' free exercise right to a kosher diet, one must keep in mind that the
purpose of this Note is neither to reject the standards of review applied in kosher
diet cases nor to argue for the adoption of a new standard of review. The standards of review have been discussed and criticized too fully elsewhere to warrant
extended treatment here, see generally Dei, supra note 62 (analyzing TurnerlO'Lone
test); Religious Rights, supra (discussing and evaluating seven tests applied in
prisoners' rights cases); Zogry, supra note 8 (analyzing and evaluating TurnerIO'Lone test and RFRA), and many commentators have already argued for the
adoption of a new standard of review. See, e.g., Dei, supra note 62, at 432-36
(arguing for adoption of standard such as that outlined by Second Circuit in Abdul
Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015 (2d Cir. 1985)); Religious Rights, supra, at 857-74
(proposing variation of compelling interest test). Rather, the goal of this Note is to
suggest that, regardless of the standard used, the "nexus between ... prison
correctional goals is too tenuous to withstand scrutiny."
dietary policy and ...
F. Supp. 1405, 1412 (D. Colo. 1998).
997
Zavaras,
v.
Beerheide
181 Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1975); see also Ashelman v.
Wawrzaszek, 111 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that "prison must provide
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regulations on the grounds that they safeguard legitimate
penological interests. 182 Part III of this Note examines the
various penological interests most commonly asserted for prohibiting or curtailing Jewish prisoners' First Amendment
rights to a kosher diet, and argues that, while the interests are
"legitimate in the abstract,"' " they are invalid justifications
for refusing to furnish kosher meals.' This Part then discusses the Federal Bureau of Prisons Common Fare Religious

a diet sufficient to sustain [inmate] in good health without violating the laws of

kashruth"); Beerheide, 997 F. Supp. at 1413 (same); Luckette v. Lewis, 883 F.
Supp. 471, 483 (same); Prushinowski v. Hambrick, 570 F. Supp. 863, 869
(E.D.N.C. 1983) (same).
" See, e.g., Johnson v. Horn, 150 F.3d 276, 282 (3d Cir. 1998) (prison officials'
refusal to provide hot kosher diet reasonably related to penological interests); Cooper v. Lanham, 145 F.3d 1323, 1998 WL 230913, at *3 (4th Cir. May 7, 1998)
(unpublished disposition) (same); Ben-Avraham v. Moses, 1 F.3d 1246, No. 9235604, 1993 WL 269611, at *3 (9th Cir. July 19, 1993) (unpublished disposition)
(same); Cooper v. Rogers, 788 F. Supp. 255, 260 (D. Md. 1991) (same).
"RBeerheide v. Zavaras, 997 F. Supp. 1405, 1412 (D. Colo. 1998) (holding that
although concerns about cost, security and proliferation of lawsuits are "legitimate
in the abstract[,] . . . the nexus between the prison dietary policy and the correctional goals is too tenuous to withstand scrutiny").
'" Justice Stevens, dissenting in Turner, recognized the inherent unfairness
created when any plausible penological interest could be used to justify prison
regulations. Justice Stevens, criticizing the deferential Turner standard, stated:
[I]f the standard can be satisfied by nothing more than a "logical connection" between the regulation and any legitimate penological concern perceived by a cautious warden, it is virtually meaningless. Application of
the standard would seem to permit disregard for inmates' constitutional
rights whenever the imagination of the warden produces a plausible security concern and a deferential trial court is able to discern a logical connection between that concern and the challenged regulation. Indeed, there
is a logical connection between prison discipline and the use of bullwhips
on prisoners ....
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 100-01 (1987).
In cases regarding Jewish prisoners' First Amendment rights to a kosher diet,
many courts have recognized, fortunately, that the prison officials' proffered
penological interests do not adequately substantiate the prison dietary policy. See,
e.g., Ashelman v. Wawrzaszek, 111 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that
difficulties envisioned by prison officials in providing kosher diets not insurmountable); Beerheide, 997 F. Supp. at 1412 (holding that although the DOC's governmental concerns about cost, security, and the proliferation of other lawsuits are
"legitimate in the abstract[,] . . . the nexus between the prison dietary policy and
the correctional goals is too tenuous to withstand scrutiny"); Prushinowski v.
Hambrick, 570 F. Supp. 863, 868 (E.D.N.C. 1983) (holding that kosher food could
be provided from "controlled sources wherein security measures can reasonably be
maintained"); United States v. Kahane, 396 F. Supp. 687, 703 (E.D.N.Y. 1975)
(holding that kosher dinners could be provided "with virtually no administrative
inconvenience").
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Diet program currently in effect and submits that this program
is solid evidence that all prisons can accommodate observant
Jewish prisoners' requests for kosher diets with relatively little
or no administrative inconvenience.
A. PenologicalInterests Arguably Justifying Prison Dietary
Regulations and Why These Interests Are Invalid
Justificationsfor Refusing to Furnish Kosher Diets
Judicial opinions have made clear that the courts lack the
qualifications to deal with the practical needs of prison administration." Similarly, several commentators have noted:
The problems of routine jail and prison administration in conflict
with the asserted rights of prisoners rarely have simple answers.
Accordingly, the need for administrative on-the-spot decisional flexibility, and the emergence of professionalism and credentialing
among corrections personnel have reinforced the much older attitude
of judges that corrections administrators... of various skills must
be accorded generous discretion in their choice and implementation
of policies and practices necessary in their judgment to maintain institutional safety, order, discipline, security, and the punitive and
186
rehabilitative objectives of incarceration.

Against that background, prison officials, in response to
Jewish prisoners' demands for kosher diets, have provided a
number of explanations for the restrictions they have placed
upon the inmates' First Amendment rights. Among the most
common are: institutional security,"7 running a simplified
15 See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987) ("Running a prison is

an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires expertise, planning, and the
commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the
legislative and executive branches of government."); Madison v. Horn, No. Civ. A.
97-3143, 1998 WL 531830, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 1998) (stating that "[flederal
courts give great deference to prison officials' decisions with respect to the running
of prisons").
I" BARBARA B. KNIGHT & STEPHEN T. EARLY, JR., PRISONERs' RIGHTS IN AMERICA 3 (1986) (emphasis added). The authors further state that judges are inadequate substitutes for the expertise of prison officials because, presumably, corrections officials possess a better understanding of the complexities inherent in prison
administration. See id.
"' See Beerheide v. Zavaras, 997 F. Supp. 1405, 1412 (D. Colo. 1998) (Department of Corrections refusing to provide Jewish inmates kosher diets, arguing, inter
alia, that providing kosher meals would adversely impact security); United States
v. Huss, 394 F. Supp. 752, 762 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 520
F.2d 598 (2d. Cir. 1975) (same).
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and prolifera-

1. Institutional Security
Perhaps the most important goal of prison officials is that
of institutional security,'
and prison administrators frequently argue that providing kosher diets to Jewish inmates
would present security problems.'92 Prison officials, in denying Jewish inmates' requests for kosher diets, appear to be
motivated by the fact that Jewish inmates might obtain kosher
food from unknown sources and contraband could be easily
smuggled to inmates for whom the kosher food is designat18 See, e.g., Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that
prison officials have legitimate interest in running simplified dining service, but
remanding case for determination of whether denial of kosher diet was reasonably
related to that interest); see also Kahey v. Jones, 836 F.2d 948, 950 (5th Cir.
1988) (holding that prison has a legitimate interest in running a simplified food
service "rather than a full-scale restaurant").
"" See, e.g., Beerheide, 997 F. Supp. at 1412 (noting that Colorado Department
of Corrections cited cost concerns as justification for policy of not providing kosher
diets); Cooper v. Rogers, 788 F. Supp. 255, 260 (D. Md. 1991) (denying Jewish
inmate's request for particularized kosher diet, holding that costs associated with
kosher meals "cannot be dismissed as de minimis").
"80See Cooper v. Lanham, 145 F.3d 1323, No. 97-7183, 1998 WL 230913, at *2
(4th Cir. May 7, 1998) (unpublished disposition) (discussing prison officials' concerns that if one dietary request is granted similar demands will proliferate); BenAvraham v. Moses, 1 F.3d 1246, No. 92-35604, 1993 WL 269611, at *2 (9th Cir.
July 13, 1993) (unpublished disposition) (same); Kahey, 836 F.2d at 950 (same);
Beerheide, 997 F. Supp. at 1410-12 (same).
19' See KNIGHT & EARLY, supra note 186, at 2-3. The authors assert:
Central to the administration of detention facilities is the institutional
and societal consideration of internal security. Prison officials must be
left that minimum freedom which permits them to take appropriate action to ensure the safety of both correctional personnel and inmates and
to prevent escape, on the one hand, and the unlawful entry of persons or
contraband into the institution, on the other. Even when challenged administrative practices or regulations are alleged to transgress fundamental interests of inmates, the conflict of values must be adjusted in light
of institutional security.
Id.
192 See, e.g., Beerheide, 997 F. Supp. at 1412 (Department
of Corrections refusing to provide Jewish inmates kosher diets, arguing, inter alia, that providing
kosher meals would adversely impact security); United States v. Huss, 394 F.
Supp. 752, 762 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 520 F.2d 598 (2d. Cir.
1975) (same); see also PALMER, supra note 17, § 5.2.1, at 59 ("The duty of prison
officials to maintain security within an institution is the most frequently cited
justification for limiting an inmate's religious freedom.").
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ed.'93 Additionally, prison officials argue that many available
kosher food items are contained in packaging that is potentially dangerous. 94 Further, providing Jewish inmates kosher
diets would adversely impact prison discipline and order because other inmates would be led to believe that the Jewish
inmates are receiving special treatment. 95
Although the prison officials' security concerns are legitimate, they are purely speculative; thus, they should not constitute a sufficient justification for refusing to provide kosher
diets.' 9s Despite the fact that prison officials continually ex-

" See Johnson v. Horn, 150 F.3d 276, 282 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that Jewish
inmates' requests for hot kosher meals "creates legitimate security concerns [for
the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections], including bringing additional foods
from new sources into the Prison"); Huss, 394 F. Supp. at 762 (noting that security problems referred to by Bureau of Prisons, such as the relative ease with
which contraband could be smuggled in to the prison, could not be overlooked).
"' See Response to Defendants' Proposed Dietary Plan at 11, Ashelman v.
Wawrzaszek, 111 F.3d 674 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. Civ. 83-1072) (noting that the
Arizona Department of Corrections asserted that providing Jewish inmate certain
readily available kosher food items, such as canned food with pull tops, implicates
security concerns).
"9 See Johnson, 150 F.3d at 282 (stating that providing Jewish prisoners kosher food creates security concerns because of the other inmates' possible beliefs
that the Jewish inmates were getting special treatment); Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d
873, 878 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting warden's contention that if other inmates are not
similarly treated, they might perceive the Jewish inmate as being favored); Huss,
394 F. Supp. at 762 ("[lit would be contrary to good order and discipline to permit
one group of prisoners, or organizations supporting them, to pay for their more
expensive, special [kosher] food.").
' The United States Supreme Court has held that speculative concerns do not
constitute compelling government interests. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 223-25 (1972). In that case, the state of Wisconsin sought to compel Amish
parents to require their children, who graduated from eighth grade, to attend
formal high school. The state argued that if Amish children left their church they
would not be able to survive in society without the education available in the
years of formal high school. See id. at 224. The Court held, however, that the
state's interest was "highly speculative" because there was no specific evidence that
Amish children would burden society because of their lack of a formal high school
education. Id. (emphasis added).
Additionally, Justice Stevens, dissenting in Turner, expressed concern about
prison officials' speculation. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 100-16 (1987)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that applying a deferential standard to prison regulations
would seem to permit disregard for inmates' constitutional rights whenever the imagination of the warden produces a plausible security concern
and a deferential trial court is able to discern a logical connection between that concern and the challenged regulation. Indeed, there is a
logical connection between prison discipline and the use of bullwhips on
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press concern that contraband could be smuggled into the
prison, these prison officials consistently fail to provide any
evidence whatsoever that security problems result from allowing Jewish prisoners to receive kosher diets.197 Further, notwithstanding the prison officials' fear that Jewish prisoners
might obtain food from unknown sources, courts have recognized that kosher food can be provided for Jewish inmates
from "controlled sources wherein security measures can reasonably be maintained."198 In fact, pre-prepared kosher meals
are readily available from a number of well-known manufacturers throughout the country. 99 The vice-president of marketing for Dannon Company, a popular yogurt maker, stated,
"'Virtually every major food company in the US utilizes kosher
certification, and many spend significant advertising dollars
behind marketing this fact."'2 0 Thus, prison officials' security

prisoners ....
Id. at 100-01. Justice Stevens continued in a footnote: "The Court's rather openended 'reasonableness' standard makes it much too easy to uphold restrictions on
prisoners' First Amendment rights on the basis of administrative concerns and
speculation about possible security risks rather than on the basis of evidence that
the restrictions are needed to further an important governmental interest." Id. at
101 n.1 (emphasis added).
197 See, e.g., Beerheide v. Zavaras, 997 F. Supp. 1405, 1412 (D. Colo. 1998)
(holding that prison officials presented no evidence to support their position that
providing Jewish inmates kosher meals would adversely impact security);
Prushinowski v. Hambrick, 570 F. Supp. 863, 868 (E.D.N.C. 1983) (holding that
although prison officials argued that contraband could be hidden in food and
smuggled into prison, prison officials presented no evidence that attempts had
been made to smuggle contraband into the prison in the kosher food).
198 Prushinowski, 570 F. Supp. at 868.
199 Indeed, at least one court recognized this fact nearly 25 years ago. See United States v. Kahane, 396 F. Supp. 687, 702-03 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) ("[Plrisoners could
purchase, under their normal food requisitioning procedures, pre-prepared, frozen,
foil-wrapped kosher meals accompanied by disposable eating utensils; they are
readily available from a number of manufacturers with numerous distributorships
around the country.").
2" Henry, supra note 39, at 6 (quoting Yossi Heber, vice-president of marketing
for Dannon Company); see also Hanania, supra note 40, at 1E ("[Kosher foods]
range from See's Candies to Dole pineapples, from Ronzoni macaroni to Bazooka
bubble gum, from Sunkist orange juice to Knudsen's dairy products. Kosher foods
also include King's Hawaiian Bakery and Country Hearth corn bread; A & W Root
Beer and Seven-Up; Pillsbury Dough and Campbell's Soups . . . ."). While it is
possible that Jewish inmates may receive kosher items from unknown Jewish
community groups, see Kahane, 396 F. Supp. at 702, prison officials can conveniently inspect the incoming food for contraband as part of customary prison regulations. See, e.g., Prushinowski, 570 F. Supp. at 868 (holding that although Jewish
inmate is entitled to kosher food certified by the Central Rabbinical Congress,
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concerns that Jewish inmates might obtain food from unknown
sources are unwarranted. Moreover, notwithstanding prison
officials' concerns that various readily available kosher food
items are stored in dangerous packaging, such as canned food
with pull tops, regular food in similar "dangerous" packaging is
frequently available to all inmates in prison stores and is sold
20
to inmates without adversely impacting security. '
Furthermore, despite prison officials' fears that other inmates may perceive Jewish prisoners as being favored, and
thus adversely impact prison morale, courts have never
weighed these concerns heavily in their evaluations of prison
dietary policy.0 2 "This effect.., is present in every case that
requires special accommodations for adherents to particular
religious practices."0 ' Additionally, prison systems already
provide diets to other religious groups, including Sikhs, Mus04
lims, and Seventh-Day Adventists, without disruption, and
where prison officials refuse to grant religious requests that do
not significantly impact prison resources any more than other
religious accommodations, courts have held that prison officials
are acting irrationally.2 5 Lastly, despite prison officials' ex-

prison officials could personally inspect incoming food items for contraband consistent with prison procedure). One court has even suggested that Jewish inmates
could inspect the food themselves in the presence of prison officials. See id.
2, See Response to Defendants' Proposed Dietary Plan at 11, Ashelman v.
Wawrzaszek, 111 F.3d 674 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. Civ. 83-1072) (citations omitted)
("The State asserts that providing some of the [readily available kosher food]
items, such as canned food with pull tops, causes security concerns. However, food
with pull top lids are sold by the State to inmates in the prison store. Further,
canned tuna, which the State also makes an objection, is provided in the inmate
store, as are can openers. The purchase of these food items has been authorized
by the State and these items are sold to inmates, presumably without any breach
of security or disruption to the prison. Thus, these objections are nothing more
than another excuse why certain [kosher] foods cannot be provided.').
2"3 See, e.g., Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting warden's
contention that other inmates might perceive Jewish inmate as being favored, but
holding that this effect is not dispositive); see also Ashelman, 111 F.3d at 677
(same).
203 Ward, 1 F.3d at 878.
22,See Ashelman, 111 F.3d at 678 (noting that because the prison accommodates the dietary requirements of other religious groups, "itdoes not appear that
the difficulties envisioned by the prison are insurmountable").
201 See Howard v. United States, 864 F. Supp. 1019, 1027 (D. Colo. 1994) (holding that where satanist was asking for same privileges granted to every other
religious group but was denied requests, security concerns discussed by prison
officials were pretextual).
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pressed security concerns, courts have explicitly stated that
security interests would not be undermined in any way by
providing kosher diets.206
2. Running a Simplified Food System
Another common penological interest asserted for prohibiting or limiting Jewish prisoners' right to a kosher diet is that
of running a simplified prison food system,0 7 and because of
the strict rules regarding preparation and storage of kosher
food, 0 8 prison officials fear that providing kosher meals
would disrupt the convenient operation of the food service. In
Ward v. Walsh,0 9 for example, a Jewish inmate requested a
kosher diet that required the prison not merely to provide
kosher food, but to prepare and to store the kosher food in a
particular manner.2 0 Further, the Jewish prisoner asked
that the "food be served in an 'eating area [that is] kept kosher
for all Jewish inmates.''
Prison officials refused to provide
this particularized diet, citing their interest in running a simplified food service.212
Additionally, a case occasionally arises where an observant
Jewish inmate cannot eat the type of kosher food that is acceptable to most observant Jews.210 Prison officials argue,
therefore, that accommodating this wide range of requests
would turn the prison dining service into a full-scale restau206 See, e.g., Luckette v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 471, 481 (D. Ariz. 1995) ("Clearly,
provision of a Kosher diet would not implicate any safety concerns.").
207 See, e.g., Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that

prison officials have legitimate interest in running simplified dining service, but
remanding case for determination of whether denial of kosher diet was reasonably
related to that interest); see also Kahey v. Jones, 836 F.2d 948, 950 (5th Cir.
1988) (holding that prison has a legitimate interest in running a simplified food
service "rather than a full-scale restaurant").
209 See supra Part I.B.
2I9 1 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 1993).
210 See id. at 877.
211 See id. (alteration in original).
See id.
213 See, e.g., Prushinowski v. Hambrick, 570 F. Supp. 863, 865 n.2 (E.D.N.C.
21

1983). In that case, the Jewish inmate, since his arrival at the prison, refused to
eat the kosher food made available to other observant Jewish inmates on the
grounds that the kosher food provided was not certified by the Central Rabbinical
Congress. See id. The Central Rabbinical Congress certifies the food which may be
eaten by Orthodox Jews of the Hasidic community. See id.
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rant.2 14 Arguably, requests such as these are administratively
unfeasible and hinder the simplified operation of the prison
food service.
Although maintenance and monitoring of a kosher kitchen
and eating area may cause some disruption to the simplified
operation of the prison food service,"' prisons do not need to
maintain kosher kitchens and eating areas in order to provide
kosher meals;216 thus, kosher meals can be provided without
21 7
significant disruption. In Ashelman v. Wawrzaszek, for example, the Ninth Circuit held that providing a kosher diet is
not unduly burdensome on the Arizona Department of Corrections.2 1 In reaching its decision, the court stated that a variety of kosher foods, many of which required no cooking, would
2 19
satisfy the Jewish inmate's request. Further, notwithstand-

214 For a good illustration of this concern, see Kahey v. Jones, 836 F.2d 948,

949-50 (5th Cir. 1988). In Kahey, a Muslim inmate requested the prison to provide
meals "consisting of eggs, fruit and vegetables served with shells or peels, on
paper plates." Id. at 950. The court denied the inmate's request, see id. at 951,
and stated that the prison "has a legitimate governmental interest in running a
simplified prison food service rather than a full-scale restaurant." Id. at 950.
215 Rabbis, themselves, admit that maintenance and monitoring of a kosher
kitchen would be problematic. See, e.g., Supplemental Answering Brief of Defendants/Appellees/Cross-Appelants at 13, Ashelman v. Wawrzaszek, 111 F.3d 674
(9th Cir. 1997) (No. 95-15071) (noting that plaintiff inmate's expert, Rabbi
Levertov, admitted that running kosher kitchen would present problems). Some
prisons, nevertheless, do maintain kosher kitchens. See, e.g., Garza v. Carlson, 877
F.2d 14, 16 (8th Cir. 1989) (Jewish inmate provided with food prepared in kosher
kitchen in federal correctional facility).
...See United States v. Kahane, 396 F. Supp. 687, 702-03 (E.D.N.Y. 1975)
("[P]risons could purchase, under their normal food requisitioning procedures, preprepared, frozen, foil-wrapped kosher meals accompanied by disposable eating utensils. Such frozen meals . . . are now widely available on airplanes, trains, buses,
in hospitals, and at hotels and motels. These dinners could be prepared with virtually no administrative inconvenience by heating in regular prison kitchens."). Although preparation of kosher food requires that everything be kept separate (the
food must be prepared and served in separate containers, the utensils and containers used for cooking must be sanitized in separate sinks and dishwashers, and
separate ovens must be used for kosher items), see supra Part I.B. and accompanying notes, providing a pre-prepared kosher meal, as well as disposable utensils
and containers, could avoid these strict preparation requirements. See supra Part
I.B. Additionally, pre-packaged kosher meals can be heated in a non-kosher oven
as long as the products are heated (and served) with the manufacturer's doubleseal wrapping intact. See supra Part I.B.
217 Ill

F.3d 674 (9th Cir. 1997).

21, See id. at 678.

...See id. at 677-78. The court noted that the prison officials "could provide
whole fruits, vegetables, nuts, tinned fish, dairy products, and kosher cereals that
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ing prison officials' concerns that some observant Jews cannot
eat the type of kosher food that is acceptable to other observant Jews, thus turning the prison food service into a full-scale
restaurant, courts have held that this concern is an invalid
reason for refusing to provide requested kosher diets.

would satisfy the laws of kashruth, and serve them on disposable plates with
disposable utensils-which also would satisfy kashruth. Most of these things are
'off-the-shelf and nothing . . . suggests that the cost would be appreciable." Id. at
677. In fact, the Jewish inmate's counsel provided a list of food items that are
certified by the Orthodox Union (the largest kosher certification organization). See
Response to Defendant's Proposed Dietary Plan at 9-10, Ashelman v. Wawrzaszek,
111 F.3d 674 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. Civ. 83-1072). The list is as follows:
From Exhibit G:
Nabisco Mix 'N Eat Variety Pack-D cereals, Quaker Oats cereal products,
including Life, Oat Bran, and Puffed Rice, Ralston Regular Instant Oatmeal, Roman Meal cereals, Wheatabix cereals, Nescafe Instant coffees,
Lipton teas, Heinz mustard and relish, Nabisco Oreo cookies, Sun Giant
raisins, Bumble Bee salmon and tuna, Starkist and Chicken of the Sea
tuna, Heinz pureed beets, carrots, green beans, peaches, pears, and spinach, Sunkist orange juice, Reese's, Laura Scudder's, and Smucker's peanut butters, and Fisher nuts.
From Exhibit H:
Pepperidge Farms bagels, breads and muffins; Sara Lee bagels and muffins; Ralston crackers and fruit bars; Keebler crackers and cookies;
Nabisco crackers, cookies and snack bars; Dannon yogurt; Kraft cheeses
and sour cream; Dole dried fruits and nuts; Green Giant canned corn,
beans and peas; Heinz beans; Libby's spears, beans, beets, red cabbage,
carrots, green beans, peas, and potatoes; Seneca apple sauce, asparagus
and mushrooms; Nabisco/Fleischman's Blue Bonnet margarine; Skippy,
Planters and Jif peanut butters; Planters nuts; Frito-Lay's, Ruffles and
Pringles potato chips; Rold Gold Pretzels; Heinz soups; and Heinz ketchup.
Id. (citations omitted).
' See Prushinowski v. Hambrick, 570 F. Supp. 863, 867 (E.D.N.C. 1983). Prison officials argued that they did not have to accommodate a Jewish inmate's request for a kosher diet because the food requested was different than the food
acceptable to other observant Jewish inmates. See id. The court held, however,
that the inmate's "prerogative to exercise his beliefs under the First Amendment
is in no way diminished by the fact that his faith requires that he not eat certain
food that is acceptable to most Orthodox Jews." Id.
For a further illustration of this point, see Moskowitz v. Wilkinson, 432 F.
Supp. 947 (D. Conn. 1977). In Moskowitz, an Orthodox Jewish inmate argued that
the First Amendment forbade prison officials from requiring him to cut or shave
his facial hair. See id. at 948. Prison officials rejected the inmate's claim, arguing
that other sects within the Jewish religion permitted the removal of facial hair.
See id. at 949. The court rejected the prison officials' argument, stating. "[Tihe
fact that some Jews do not object to shaving, or that others accept the distinction
between shaving and cutting, does not defeat the [inmate's] claim. It is his own
religious belief that is asserted, not anyone else's." Id.
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Understandably, prison officials may occasionally receive
particular demands for kosher meals that are administratively
burdensome to satisfy.2 2' When faced with these demands,
however, prison officials should not automatically refuse to
provide any kosher diet. 2 Rather, prison officials could explore the many alternative options in existence that would
satisfy, if only at least partially, the Jewish inmates' request.2" While prison officials may be administratively inconvenienced by constructing kosher kitchens and providing kosher eating areas, prison officials can easily provide a wide
assortment of pre-packaged kosher items and serve these items
in a non-kosher eating area. 2

See, e.g., Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 1992) (Jewish inmate requested kosher diet that required the prison not merely to provide kosher food, but to
prepare and to store the kosher food in a particular manner).
' See id. (prison officials refusing to provide particularized kosher diet on
grounds that they have legitimate interest in running simplified food system).
2 In Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 1992), the court held that although
the prison has a legitimate interest in running a simplified food service, there
were insufficient findings regarding whether the prison officials had even explored
the possibility of the existence of other options that would accommodate the Jewish inmate. See id. at 878. "Although we must give deference to the prison
official's own assessment of the burden on prison operations, we cannot simply
accept the warden's assertion . .. that the disruption would be significant." Id.
Prison officials could explore various options, including, inter alia: (1) serving
a cold alternative kosher diet, consisting of fresh fruits and vegetables, milk, eggs,
kosher pastries, cheese, bread, fruit juices, teas, and coffee, see, e.g., Bass v.
Coughlin, 800 F. Supp. 1066, 1068 n.1 (N.D.N.Y. 1991), affd, 976 F.2d 98 (2d Cir.
1992); and (2) allowing the self-preparation of certain fruits and vegetables, providing tinned fish, boiled eggs and cheeses from regular institution supplies, and
acceptable breads, supplemented by hot pre-packaged/pre-prepared frozen kosher
meals. See, e.g., Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492, 496, 496 n.1 (2d Cir. 1975). In
addition, prison officials could consult with the Orthodox Union and the Aleph
Institute regarding the requirements of kashruth and the many possibilities of
convenient and feasible kosher diets. See Response to Defendants' Proposed Dietary
Plan at 10-11, Ashelman v. Wawrzaszek, 111 F.3d 674 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. Civ.
83-1072) (noting that the Federal Bureau of Prisons, which provides a kosher diet
to Jewish inmates, has routinely consulted with the Orthodox Union and Aleph
Institute); see also Orthodox Union, supra note 41; The Aleph Institute (visited
Nov. 9, 1998) <http:j/www.nauticom.nettusers/moishe/aleph.html> [hereinafter Aleph
Institute].
4 See Ward, 1 F.3d at 879 (noting that it may be possible to provide Jewish
inmates with "non-defiled foodstuffs, even if the dining area is not kept kosher").
2
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3. Cost Considerations
Cost considerations are another factor often cited by prison
officials as a justification for denying Jewish inmates' requests
for kosher food.22 Prison officials generally argue that they
cannot afford to buy special kosher food items within the limits
2 2 s for
of the existing prison budget. In Beerheide v. Zavaras,
example, the Colorado Department of Corrections refused to
provide kosher meals to three Orthodox prisoners on the
grounds that the kosher meals would adversely affect the
prison's dietary budget.22 7 The Department of Corrections
Food Services department had an annual budget of approximately $8.25 million, and the prison officials testified that
providing kosher meals to all the Orthodox Jewish inmates
would cost nearly $1.4 million each year, a substantial portion
of the prison's annual food budget.2 s
Similarly, in Cooper v. Rogers,229 a Jewish inmate housed
at the Maryland Penitentiary was denied his requested kosher
diet because of budgetary concerns. In agreeing with the
prison officials and upholding the dietary restrictions, the
court stated:
In the final analysis, the question comes down to one of cost. The
two kosher meals which [the inmate] currently receives costs the
state approximately $7.50 each day. The average amount budgeted
for an inmates daily food allowance is much less, approximately
$1.79. A specially ordered breakfast for [the inmate] would cost
between $2.50 and $5.00, compared with approximately $.50 if [the
inmate] ate the allegedly kosher items already available at break-

See, e.g., Beerheide v. Zavaras, 997 F. Supp. 1405, 1412 (D. Colo. 1998)
(noting that Colorado Department of Corrections cited cost concerns as justification
for policy of not providing kosher diets); Cooper v. Rogers, 788 F. Supp. 255, 260
(D. Md. 1991) (denying Jewish inmate's request for particularized kosher diet,
holding that costs associated with kosher meals "cannot be dismissed as de minimis"); see also PAIMER, supra note 17, § 5.2.3, at 62 (noting that economic considerations are often cited by prison administrators as a justification for limiting
inmates' free exercise of religion).
226 997 F. Supp. 1405 (D. Colo. 1998).
See id. at 1410.

' See id. at 1412. The court ultimately held, however, that "mathematically
speaking, the actual annual cost of providing these three inmates with kosher
meals, by force of reason, must be regarded as a minuscule portion of the Food
Services' annual budget. Thus, [the prison officials'] concerns . . . is [sic] without
merit." Id.
"9 788 F. Supp. 255 (D. Md. 1991).
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fast. Additionally, a pre-packaged kosher breakfast unlike lunch and
dinner, can only be ordered from a caterer in New York. These costs
cannot be dismissed as de minimis .....

In addition to the actual cost of kosher food, prison officials frequently express concern that they would be required to
prepare kosher kitchens within the prisons and that the construction costs would be too burdensome on the prisons' budget." 1 Prison administrators contend that even one centralized kosher kitchen system within each prison would be too
burdensome on the budget. 2 Centralized kosher kitchens,
apart from the regular dining facilities, would require that the
kosher food be transported; thus, compelling the purchase of
food carts to keep the food either cold or hot."s
Notwithstanding the prison officials' budgetary concerns,
one court has held that cost concerns alone cannot
least
at
justify prison officials' refusal to provide kosher diets.' Further, prison officials can provide kosher diets by simply purchasing readily available food products at minimal cost." 5
The Ninth Circuit noted that prison officials can provide kosher meals consisting of "'off-the-shelf [products] and nothing.., suggests that the cost would be appreciable."23 8 Even
assuming, arguendo, that some kosher food is more expensive

"' Id. at 260; see also Ben-Avraham v. Moses, 1 F.3d 1246, No. 92-35604, 1993
WL 269611, at *2 (9th Cir. July 19, 1993) (refusing to provide Jewish inmate
requested kosher diet on grounds that cost of providing kosher meals that met
inmate's demands was nearly three times as great as the cost of providing regular
prison meals).
"' See Supplemental Answering Brief of Defendants/Appellees/Cross Appellants
at 13, Ashelman v. wawrzaszek, 111 F.3d 674 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 95-15071) (arguing that, because of construction costs, Arizona Department of Corrections "could
not place a kosher kitchen within each non-kosher inmate ADOC kitchen"); see
also Beerheide v. Zavaras, 997 F. Supp. 1405, 1412 (D. Colo. 1998) (noting that
cost of equipping each Department of Corrections facility would be approximately
$8,200 per facility, excluding cold storage costs).
' See Supplemental Answering Brief of Defendants/Appellees/Cross Appellants
at 13, Ashelman v. wawrzaszek, 111 F. 3d 674 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 95-15071)
(discussing the problems of a centralized kosher kitchen system).
23

See id.

See Prushinowski v. Hambrick, 570 F. Supp. 863, 868-69 (E.D.N.C. 1983)
(holding that "budgetary considerations alone cannot excuse the prison from according [the Jewish inmate] his First Amendment rights").
' For a list of readily available kosher food items, see supra note 219 and
accompanying text. For other possibilities of convenient and feasible diets, see
supra note 223 and accompanying text.
' Ashelman v. Wawrzaszek, 111 F.3d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 1997).
'
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than regular food, courts have recognized that only a small
fraction of prisoners are required to adhere to the laws of
kashruth; thus, the cost of providing kosher meals to these
relatively few prisoners is minimal.2

'

Additionally,

despite

concerns about the construction costs of kosher kitchens within each prison system, prison officials do not have to incur
these costs. Because pre-packaged and pre-prepared kosher
food can be provided,23 8 construction of kosher kitchens
is unnecessary.2 3
Moreover, prison officials can easily consult with local or
national Jewish community groups to discuss how kosher diets
can be provided at minimal cost. The Federal Bureau of Prisons, which provides kosher diets to Jewish inmates,240 routinely consults with the Orthodox Union 24' regarding kosher

' See Luckette v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 471, 480 (D. Ariz. 1995) ("Although, the
cost [of kosher food] may be greater, this additional expense is not a compelling
governmental interest. Only a few prisoners have legitimate religious beliefs which
require they maintain a Kosher diet, and the expense of providing Kosher meals
to these few prisoners is minimal."); see also Beerheide v. Zavaras, 997 F. Supp.
1405, 1412 (D. Colo. 1998) ("[Mlathematically speaking, the actual annual cost of
providing these three [Jewish] inmates with kosher meals . . . must be regarded
as a minuscule portion of the Food Services' annual budget. Thus, [the prison
officials'] concerns about the effect . . . on their costs is without merit.").
Prison officials express a concern that if a kosher diet is furnished to some
inmates, prisons will be bombarded with applications for it. See United States v.
Kahane, 396 F. Supp 687, 703 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). One court has noted, however,
that "the repetitive and spartan nature of such a diet under prison conditions
would undoubtedly discourage those who are not sincere." Id. at 703. The New
York State prison system is a good illustration of this point. As of September
1993, there were 907 Jewish inmates housed in New York State correctional facilities. See Goldman, supra note 47, at 20. When the New York State Department of
Correctional Services began its kosher food program, however, fewer than 100
Jewish inmates were expected to participate. See id.
' See supra Part I.B.; see also Kahane, 396 F. Supp. at 702-03 ("[Plrisons
could purchase, under their normal food requisitioning procedures, pre-prepared,
frozen, foil-wrapped kosher meals accompanied by disposal eating utensils. Such
frozen meals . . . are now widely available on airplanes, trains, buses, in hospitals, and at hotels and motels."). In fact, some pre-prepared and pre-packaged
kosher diets cost less than other kosher diets. See Johnson v. Horn, 150 F.3d 276,
281 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that daily cost of purchasing frozen, pre-packaged kosher meals is approximately $4.00 per inmate, whereas daily cost of cold kosher
diet is $7.24 per inmate).
23 Some correctional facilities, however, maintain a kosher kitchen. See, e.g.,
Garza v. Carlson, 877 F.2d 14, 16 (8th Cir. 1989) (Jewish inmate provided with
food prepared in kosher kitchen in federal prison).
240 See infra Part III.B.
241 See Orthodox Union, supra note 41.
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issues.2 42 Similarly, the Aleph Institute routinely offers advice to prison officials regarding their concerns about kosher
diets.243 In fact, the Aleph Institute, as well as other Jewish
groups, often helps fund the furnishing of kosher meals in
prison by donating kosher products. 2"' Thus, because "it may
be possible to comply with the laws [of kashruth] in substantial part at de minimis cost,"" 5 budgetary concerns are an invalid justification for refusing to provide kosher diets.
4. Proliferation of Other Religious Dietary Demands
A final justification often asserted for prohibiting or limiting Jewish inmates' First Amendment rights to a kosher diet is
the proliferation of other religious dietary demands. 246 The

242 See Response

to Defendants' Proposed Dietary Plan at 10, Ashelman v.

Wawrzaszek, 111 F. 3d 674 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. Civ. 83-1072). The attorneys for
the Jewish inmate noted that Rabbi Buchbinder, on behalf of the Orthodox Union,
stated that he would make himself available to answer any questions from food
services administrators within the Arizona Department of Corrections. See id. at
10-11.
24 See Aleph Institute, supra note 223.
'" See id.;see also Hearings on The Need for Federal Protection of Religious
Freedom After Boerne v. Flores Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 4
(1998) (statement of Isaac M. Jaroslawicz, Director of Legal Affairs for the Aleph
Institute) ("Illinois has just announced a unique partnership with Aleph's affiliated
Rabbi in that state . . . that will insure that Jewish inmates at more than 20
prisons in that state will receive sufficient kosher-for-Passover foods to observe the
upcoming holiday .... Other states, and many hundreds of chaplains of good
faith employed in their prison systems, have contacted Aleph for donations of tens
supplies."). Other
of thousands of pounds of matzo, grape juice, and other ...
Jewish community groups have attempted to establish relationships with prisons,
offering to provide kosher food to the prisons' Jewish inmates. See Cooper v.
Smith, 145 F.3d 1323, No. 97-7183, 1998 WL 230913, at *2 (4th Cir. Mar. 17,
1998) (unpublished disposition) (noting that the Jewish Big Brother League is
willing to pay for and deliver pre-packaged frozen kosher meals to Maryland prison, or, in the alternative, provide volunteers to prepare kosher meals in prison
kitchen, or pay Maryland Department of Corrections costs associated with having
prison personnel prepare kosher diets); see also Ann M. Norton, Synagogue-State
Program Now Serves Jewish Inmates, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Sept. 29, 1984, available
in (visited Nov. 14, 1998) <http://www.rickross.comlreferencelJewpris3.html> (discussing the "Adopt a Penal Institution" program, in which Arizona synagogues
offer food and services to Arizona prisons).
24 Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 1992).
24.See Cooper v. Lanham, 145 F.3d 1323, No. 97-7183, 1998 WL 230913, at *2
(4th Cir. May 7, 1998) (unpublished disposition) (discussing prison officials' concerns that if one dietary request is granted similar demands will proliferate); BenAvraham v. Moses, 1 F.3d 1246, No. 92-35604, 1993 WL 269611, at *2 (9th Cir.
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following exchange between the Chaplaincy Administrator for
the Bureau of Prisons and a Texas district court best illustrates the problem prison officials fear they would encounter if
they were compelled to furnish religious diets:
THE COURT: ... Now, do you have any opinion, knowing what you
know about this case, whether providing [a religious diet for the
inmate] would place an undue burden on the prison system, and
whether or not there is any good reason not to provide him with the
food that he says would make him comply with his religious diet?
THE WITNESS: Only in as much as if we do it for [this inmate], we
have an obligation to do it for all others who would make individual
requests and that would be an undue burden for the prison system.
THE COURT: In what way?
THE WITNESS: The proliferation of those requests, the individualization. We have a number of self-initiating, self-authenticating
religions which we could name, requiring specifics for their own
established dietary and sacramental needs ....
Based on the requests that we've had and denied in the past, I would say that it
would be a very strong likelihood that others seeing that an individual could request specifically what they wanted, they also would. It's
a phenomenon within the prison setting.
THE COURT: You are saying that if this were granted, that would
go up, using the old phrase, go up the grapevine to the areas
throughout the United States?
THE WITNESS: My experience is that that has happened and
would happen.247

Prison officials fear that such a proliferation effect would disrupt and unduly burden the prison system.2 48
In Cooper v. Lanham, 9 for example, the Maryland Department of Corrections refused to provide an Orthodox Jewish
inmate a kosher diet because the prison officials expected that
providing kosher meals would prompt other inmates of different religions to make similar requests for religious diets."'

July 13, 1993) (unpublished disposition) (same); Kahey v. Jones, 836 F.2d 948, 950
(5th Cir. 1988) (same); Beerheide v. Zavaras, 997 F. Supp. 1405, 1410-12 (D. Colo.
1998) (same).
2417Udey v. Kastner, 644 F. Supp. 1441, 1447 (E.D. Tex. 1986) (citations omitted).
24 See Ben-Avraham, 1993 WL 269611, at *2 (holding that accommodating Jewish inmate's kosher dietary demands could lead to a proliferation of special diet
requests, thus adversely impacting prison resources).
249 145 F.3d 1323, No. 97-7183, 1998 WL 230913 (4th Cir. May 7, 1998) (unpublished disposition).
250 See id. at *2.
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The prison officials asserted that the Department of Corrections did not have the resources to honor the additional requests, and thus, "providing special diets to some inmates and
religious directives
not to others would violate the prison's
251
which is to treat all religions equitably."
Notwithstanding prison officials' arguments, the fear that
furnishing kosher diets to Jewish inmates will result in a
plethora of religious dietary demands is "speculative at
best."" 2 Justice Brennan, dissenting in O'Lone, recognized
that, although prison officials have a "difficult and often thankless job,"" s courts should be skeptical about their speculative
justifications for prison regulations: "Mere assertions of exigency have a way of providing a colorable defense for governmental deprivation, and we should be especially wary of expansive delegations of power to those who wield it on the margins
of society." 4

2

Id.

The court noted that there were over 40 religious groups represented in

the inmate population, and that it was administratively and economically unfeasible for the Maryland Department of Corrections to accommodate all special dietary
requests. See id. at *1.
2 Beerheide v. Zavaras, 997 F. Supp. 1405, 1412 (D. Colo. 1998) (holding that
concern about proliferation of lawsuits does not justify prison officials' refusal to
provide kosher diets).
25 O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 355 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissent-

ing).

2- Id. at 358. Arguably, the Ninth Circuit, in Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 87879 (9th Cir. 1992), heeded Justice Brennan's advice. The Ward court, applying the
TurnerO'Lone factors, recognized that providing a kosher diet would impact the
prison system, not only from the cost of the Jewish inmate's diet, but also from
the cost of accommodating other inmates with similar claims of entitlement to
religious meals. See id. Because no specific factual findings were made, however,
the court chose not to speculate about the magnitude of the impact provision of
kosher diet would have. See id. at 879. Rather, the court remanded the inmate's
claim so that specific factual findings could be made, and stated:
Abrogation of this important right [to a kosher diet] cannot be justified
by the rote recitation of the O'Lone standard. The failure to provide a
kosher diet may require [the Jewish inmate] to defile himself in a manner not contemplated by O'Lone. Moreover, . . . [the Jewish inmate's]
religious practice in general has been significantly curtailed by the fact of
incarceration in the remote prison. In such circumstances, it is necessary
to evaluate carefully the justifications proffered by the prison before determining whether the Constitution allows the intrusion into the free
exercise right of the inmate.
Id. (emphasis added).
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Further, prison officials' slippery slope argument does not
pass muster even under the deferential Turner/O'Lone standard."s As the Beerheide court held:
[T]o deny these [Jewish inmates] their right to observe a central
tenet of their religion on the ground that it might lead to other lawsuits is specious. The DOC's logic would effectively preclude provision of any accommodations for religious practices in prison .... To
deny [the Jewish inmates] their right to free exercise of their sincerely held religious beliefs because it might lead to other inmates
filing lawsuits is unreasonable."

Thus, the concern about the proliferation of other religious
dietary demands is an invalid justification for refusing to furnish kosher meals to observant Jewish inmates.
B. The FederalBureau of PrisonsCommon FareReligious Diet
Program:Evidence that Kosher Diets are Compatible with
Demands of PrisonAdministration
The Federal Bureau of Prisons, under the leadership of
Director Kathleen Hawk and through the guidance of Chief
Chaplain Susan Van Baalen, has created a Common Fare Religious Diet program to accommodate the religious dietary
needs of observant Jewish inmates housed in federal correctional facilities." 7 The Bureau's Program Statement provides:

2" See Beerheide, 997 F. Supp. at 1412 (applying the Turner/O'Lone factors and
holding that concern about proliferation of lawsuits is unreasonable).
2M

Id.

2 See 28 C.F.R. § 548.20 (1997). The Bureau's regulation provides:
(a) The Bureau provides inmates requesting a religious diet reasonable
and equitable opportunity to observe their religious dietary practice within the constraints of budget limitations and the security and orderly
running of the institution and the Bureau through a common fare menu.
The inmate will provide a written statement articulating the religious
motivation for participation in the common fare program.
(b) An inmate who has been approved for a common fare menu must
notify the chaplain in writing if the inmate wishes to withdraw from the
religious diet. Approval for an inmate's religious diet may be withdrawn ... if the inmate is documented as being in violation of the
terms of the religious diet program to which the inmate has agreed in
writing. In order to preserve the integrity and orderly operation of the
religious diet program and to prevent fraud, inmates who withdraw (or
are removed) may not be immediately reestablished back into the program. The process of reapproving a religious diet for an inmate ... may
extend up to thirty days. Repeated withdrawals ...

, however, may
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The increased number of religious groups requesting diets requires a
religious diet program that provides equity to all. Common Fare is
intended to accommodate inmates whose religious dietary needs
cannot be met on the main line. The common fare menu is based
upon a 14-day cycle with special menus for the ten recognized Federal Holidays. The menus have been nutritionally analyzed and
certified as exceeding minimum daily nutritional requirements."B

In order to participate in the Common Fare program, an
observant Jewish inmate must submit an application to the
particular institution's Chaplain for approval, and, ordinarily,
the inmate can begin eating from the common fare menu with-

in two days after the prison food service receives written authorization from the Chaplain that the inmate has been approved.ss Participation in the Common Fare program is not
affected by placement in a Special Housing Unit or temporary
placement on a medically prescribed diet, and "[n]o staff may
disparage an inmate's religion or religious views or attempt to
26 °
dissuade an inmate from participatingin the program."

The existence of the Common Fare Religious Diet program
is evidence that kosher dietary regulations are an exaggerated
response to prison concerns. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has stated that the policies and practices of other
well-run penal institutions are relevant to a determination of
the necessity of a particular type of prison regulation, and the
fact that the Federal Bureau of Prisons provides kosher meals

result in inmates being subjected to a waiting period of up to one year.
(c) The chaplain may arrange for inmate religious groups to have one
appropriate ceremonial .. .meal each year for their members as identified by the religious preference reflected in the inmate's file. An inmate
may attend one religious ceremonial meal in a calendar year.
Id. Similarly, the New York State prison system consistently accommodates the
dietary needs of Jewish prisoners. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, §
7024.6 (1988) ("Prisoners are entitled to observe reasonable dietary laws established by their religion. Each facility shall provide prisoners with food items sufficient to meet such reasonable religious dietary laws."); see also Goldman, supra
note 47, at 20 (noting that kosher diets would be available in each of New York's
69 state prisons by April 1994); Hot Kosher Meals, supra note 1, at All (noting
that in March 1994, New York became the first state to offer hot kosher meals to
Jewish inmates).
Bureau of Prisons [hereinafter BOP], Food Services Manual, P.S.
" Federal
4700.04, ch. 7, at 1 (Oct. 7, 1996).
2' See id. at 2.
2" Id. If inmates miss six consecutive Common Fare meals, however, the food
services recommends that they be removed from the program. See id.
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casts doubt on the validity of prison officials' justifications for
refusing to furnish kosher diets.26 ' The ability of Jewish inmates to observe the kosher dietary laws throughout the entire
federal prison system suggests that the practice is compatible
with the interests of prison administration.26 2
Indeed, the Federal Bureau of Prisons is able to provide
kosher diets to Jewish inmates without compromising
penological interests. For example, the Bureau facilitates the
preparation of kosher food by purchasing all food (except fresh
fruits and vegetables) "fully prepared, ready to use, and certified by a recognized Orthodox Standard."263 Additionally, hot
kosher meals are available, which "shall be offered three times
a week and shall be purchased precooked, heated in their
sealed containers, and served hot."2 ' Further, kosher meals
are generally served with disposable plates and utensils.2 65
Moreover, to ease the preparation of ceremonial kosher meals,
such as Passover meals, the Chaplain consults with the food
service administrators "well in advanced [sic] of the scheduled

261 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). The Turner Court found that the

practices of the Federal Bureau of Prisons were relevant to a determination of the
existence of reasonable alternatives to the policy under challenge. See id. at 93. In
upholding a regulation on inmate-to-inmate mail, the Turner Court observed that
the Federal Bureau had adopted "substantially similar restrictions on inmate correspondence." Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 540.17 (1986)). In holding that there were reasonable alternatives to a strict marriage regulation, the Court noted that marriages by prisoners in federal correctional facilities were generally permitted absent a
threat to public safety or security. See id. at 97 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 551.10 (1986)).
The Supreme Court, in other instances, has held that the policies at other correctional facilities are relevant to a determination of the necessity of a restriction.
See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 414 n.14 (1974), overruled by Thornburgh
v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989) ("While not necessarily controlling, the policies
followed at other well-run institutions would be relevant to a determination of the
need for a particular type of restriction.").
262 See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 362 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("That Muslim inmates are able to participate in Jumu'ah throughout
the entire federal prison system suggests that the practice is, under normal circumstances, compatible with the demands of prison administration.").
26 Id. at 1. Under the common fare program, no pork or pork derivatives may
be used, and all margarine and bread must be labeled Parve for use on the Common Fare tray. See id.
264 Id. As submitted in Part IIL., supra, construction of kosher kitchens is
unneccessary; most kosher foods can be purchased pre-cooked and pre-prepared.
26 See BOP, Food Services Manual, P.S. 4700.04, ch. 7, at 2 (Oct. 7, 1996). If
reusable utensils and plates are used, they are identified for Common Fare use
only, and are washed and sanitized in a separate dish pan if a separate threecompartment sink is unavailable. See id.
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date of the observance (six to eight weeks prior)."266 Thus, the
Bureau furnishes kosher diets without compromising the simplified operation of the dining service.
In addition, institutional security is not adversely impacted under the Common Fare program. The Bureau does not
have to worry about Jewish inmates receiving kosher food from
unknown sources and the potential contraband that could be
smuggled into the prisons,6 7 because the Bureau's Food Service Department is "the only source of procurement for all food
items."2 68 Furthermore, the Bureau need not concern itself with the perception that Jewish inmates are being
favored by receiving kosher meals,269 because all religious
inmates have an "equitable opportunity to observe their
religious dietary practice."270
The Common Fare Religious Diet program demonstrates
the Federal Bureau of Prisons' commitment to accommodate
legitimate religious practices, and this good faith policy of
furnishing religious diets is consistent with the needs of prison
administration. In light of standard federal prison practice,
there exists solid support for the argument that prison officials
throughout the country can invariably furnish diets consistent
with the central tenets of Jewish inmates' religion.2 7 '
CONCLUSION
While many Jewish inmates are fortunate enough to be
housed in one of the few prison systems that consistently provide kosher diets, others are routinely deprived of this central
tenet of their religion. Prison officials frequently base such a
26 Id. at 3.
21 See supra Part III.A.l. (discussing security concerns).
26 BOP, Food Services Manual, P.S. 4700.04, ch. 7, at 3 (Oct. 7, 1996).
...See supra Part III.A.l. (discussing security concerns).
0"28 C.F.R. § 548.20 (1997) (emphasis added). The Bureau's Program Statement indicates, for example, that Christian inmates observing Lent and Muslim
inmates observing Ramadhan can be accommodated under the common fare program. See BOP, Food Services Manual, P.S. 4700.04, ch. 7, at 3-4 (Oct. 7, 1996).
"' Further support for this assertion is the fact that at least one state prison
system also consistently accommodates kosher dietary requests. See Goldman, supra note 47, at 20 (noting that kosher diets would be available in each of New
York's 69 state prisons by April 1994); Hot Kosher Meals, supra note 1, at All
(noting that in March 1994, New York became the first state to offer hot kosher
meals to Jewish inmates).
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denial on mere assertions that penological interests will be
compromised. "To deny the opportunity to affirm membership
in a spiritual community, however, may extinguish an inmate's
last source of hope for dignity and redemption." 2 2 It is hoped
that in the future, courts, as well as prison officials, will recognize that the proffered penological interests are invalid justifications for refusing to furnish kosher diets, and that the relationship between prison dietary policy and correctional goals is
tenuous. It is submitted that a colorable claim can be made
that such restrictive religious dietary policies are unnecessary,
in light of the ability of the federal prison system, and at least
one state prison system, to accommodate Jewish inmates' kosher dietary requests.
Completely foreclosing Jewish inmates from observing a
central tenet of their religion is unwarranted. Ready and feasible alternatives to current prison dietary policy exist that satisfy both the laws of kashruth and penological interests. It is
hoped that prison officials will recognize these administratively
feasible alternatives and affirm a commitment to accommodating the dietary needs of observant Jewish inmates. Prison
officials throughout the country, with advice from the Federal
Bureau of Prisons and well-established Jewish organizations,
can establish kosher diet plans compatible with the needs of
prison administration.
Jamie Aron Forman
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